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WHY JURISDICTION OVER AIRMEN ENFORCEMENT
AND CERTIFICATE CASES SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED
FROM THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
BOARD TO FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
ALAN ARMSTRONG*
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION
AN AIRMAN’S CERTIFICATE is a protected property or lib-erty interest1 that cannot be suspended or revoked without
affording the airman due process of law, including notice and
an opportunity for a hearing as provided in the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).2 Because the hearing must conform to
* Alan Armstrong practices law in Atlanta, Georgia with an emphasis on
aviation enforcement and personal injury litigation. An Airline Transport Pilot,
Mr. Armstrong flies and performs in airshows and has written three previous
articles published in the Journal of Air Law and Commerce: (1) Alan Armstrong,
Pilot Certificate Actions and Civil Penalties, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 77 (1986); (2) Alan
Armstrong, Defending False Statement Charges Relating to the FAA’s Medical Application
Form, 57 J. AIR L. & COM. 357 (1991); and (3) Alan Armstrong, Call for A
Congressional Inquiry Into the Arbitrary and Capricious Decisions of the National
Transportation Safety Board, 75 J. AIR L. & COM. 3 (2010). Kathleen A. Yodice, Esq.,
graciously assisted the author in the editing of this article. Any mistakes or
omissions in editing this article are the responsibility of the author.
1 White v. Franklin, 637 F. Supp. 601, 610–11 (N.D. Miss. 1986).
In the present case, the plaintiff’s license qualifies as a protectible
[sic] property interest[.]
. . . .
[T]he defendants’ actions totally foreclosed the plaintiff’s opportu-
nity to pursue his career as a flight examiner . . . As such, the plain-
tiff possessed a liberty interest requiring a fifth amendment due
process hearing prior to deprivation.
Id.; see also Tamura v. FAA, 675 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Haw. 1987) (Hawaii state
law gave physician property interest in redesignation as an aviation medical
examiner).
2 5 U.S.C. § 558(b) (2018) (“A sanction may not be imposed . . . except within
the jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law.”); 5 U.S.C.
§ 558(c) (2018) (requiring compliance with §§ 556 and 557 of the APA); 5
U.S.C. § 556 (2018) (hearing procedure); 5 U.S.C. § 557 (2018) (describing the
manner in which the record is perfected, objections are made, and rulings are
excepted).
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the due process requirements of the APA, it must be conducted
in an “impartial manner.”3 Proceedings to suspend, revoke, or
deny an airman’s certificate are not conducted in federal district
court. Rather, by law, jurisdiction of such cases is vested in the
National Transportation Safety Board (Board or NTSB). Unfor-
tunately, the Board has a conflict of interest that precludes the
proceedings from being conducted in an “impartial manner” ei-
ther at the administrative hearing level or on an appeal, with the
Board sitting as the appellate body. The reason the Board has a
conflict of interest is because it does not and cannot adjudicate
the airman’s case in an impartial manner since that is not its
standard in deciding whether the airman retains or loses his cer-
tificate. The statute that vests the Board with jurisdiction to adju-
dicate airmen cases provides, inter alia: “[T]he Board may
amend, modify, or reverse the order [of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA)] when the Board finds . . . that safety in air
commerce or air transportation and the public interest do not re-
quire affirmation of the order.”4
When an airman’s case appears before the Board or any of
the Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) employed by the Board,
the Board’s focus is not exclusively on the guilt or innocence of
the airman or his qualifications to hold a certificate. Rather, the
Board, by statute, is focused on “safety in air commerce . . . and
the public interest.”5 While other governmental agencies act
within a mandate to act in the “public interest,”6 the Board’s
3 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3) (2018) (“The functions of presiding employees . . . shall
be conducted in an impartial manner.”).
4 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(1)(A) (2018) (emphasis added).
5 Id.
6 Roof v. Conway, 133 F.2d 819, 827 (6th Cir. 1943) (“The duties of [the Public
Utilities Commission of Ohio] begin and end with conservation of the public
interest” and are not concerned with individual rights.); Bowles v. Skaggs, 151
F.2d 817, 821 (6th Cir. 1945) (“[O]rders of regulatory bodies are in the public
interest—they are not in the nature of suits at common law and frequently au-
thorize remedies in derogation of the common law.”); Berg v. Cincinnati New-
port & Covington Ry., 56 F. Supp. 842, 848 (E.D. Ky. 1944) (“The [SEC] and
[ICC] are agencies of the Government set up primarily to protect the public
rather than determine issues between stockholders[.]”); Radio Station WOW,
Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 131–32 (1945) (“The public interest with which the
[FCC] is charged is that involved in granting licenses.”) (internal quotation omit-
ted); United States v. Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Co., 326 U.S. 236, 241
(1945) (“The [ICC] is the guardian of the public interest in determining whether
certificates of convenience and necessity shall be granted.”); Nat’l Broad. Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1965) (“The touchstone provided by Congress
was the ‘public interest, convenience, or necessity’ [which the Communications
Act sets up as a criterion for exercise of power by the FCC] ‘is as concrete as the
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principal focus on “safety in air commerce . . . and the public
interest” creates an inherent conflict of interest that renders it
incapable of adjudicating airmen certification and enforcement
cases in an “impartial manner” as required by statute.7 The
Board, like most governmental agencies with a mandate to pro-
tect the public interest, is not concerned with the individual
rights of airmen.8 The Board’s indifference to the individual
rights of airmen explains why the Board refuses to sanction vio-
lations by the FAA of its own policies and procedures or to rule
on constitutional issues.9
In this article, the author maintains that the Board’s singular
focus on air safety and the public interest and its manifest, pro-
nounced indifference to the due process rights of airmen pre-
cludes it from acting impartially as the adjudicative body in the
United States that determines the fate of U.S. airmen and those
who seek airman certification. The Board’s institutional bias
against airmen explains why the Board, which enjoys a deferen-
tial scope of appellate review,10 has had its orders repeatedly va-
cated by the appellate courts because the Board did not follow
its own rules,11 departed from its own precedent,12 or departed
from its own precedent without explanation or without giving a
reason for doing so.13 Furthermore, in this article, the author
will review and explain a number of cases that demonstrate, in
great detail, how the Board’s institutional bias has prevented it
from affording airmen due process of law.
complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated authority per-
mit[,]’” but does not set up “a standard so indefinite as to confer an unlimited
power.”)).
7 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3) (2018).
8 See cases cited supra note 6.
9 See, e.g., Murphy, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5355, 2008 WL 205095, at *3 (Jan.
16, 2008); Moshea, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5328, 2007 WL 3088248 (Oct. 17,
2007); Moshea v. NTSB, 570 F.3d 349, 352–53 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Lybyer, N.T.S.B.
Order No. EA-4822, 2000 WL 193000, at *1 (Feb. 10, 2000) (“[W]e do not have
jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of regulations issued by the
Administrator[.]”).
10 Ramaprakash v. FAA, 346 F.3d 1121, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Our review
under the APA is highly deferential, but agency action is arbitrary and capricious
if it departs from agency precedent without explanation.”); see also 49 U.S.C.
§ 44709(d)(3) (2018); 49 U.S.C. § 44703(f) (2018): 49 U.S.C. § 44710(d)(3)
(2018) (“Findings of fact of the Board . . . are conclusive if supported by substan-
tial evidence.”).
11 Ramaprakash, 346 F.3d at 1126.
12 Id. at 1124.
13 See id.; Dillmon v. NTSB, 588 F.3d 1085, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Singleton v.
Babbitt, infra note 272; Adm’r v. Manin, infra note 282.
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There are five systemic and fundamental problems that pre-
clude the Board from performing adjudicative functions in a
fair, impartial, and predictable manner:
(1) The first problem is the Board’s bias in favor of the FAA,
which originates from the Board’s mission to ensure air
safety. While the Board’s Rules of Practice, specifically
Rule 32,14 place the burden of proof on the FAA, that is
not how adjudications are really conducted. As a practical
matter, because the Board’s mandate in deciding
whether to “amend, modify, or reverse the [FAA] or-
der”15 is “that safety in air commerce or air transportation
and public interest do not require affirmation of the or-
der[,]”16 the Board’s singular focus is whether the airman
raising a new or innovative defense is or could potentially
be a threat to air safety, or whether a decision favorable to
this particular airman could open the floodgates for air-
men in the future thereby impacting air safety or the pub-
lic interest.17 Because the Board’s paramount concern by
statute18 is “safety in air commerce or air transportation
and the public interest,”19 as a practical matter, the “real”
burden is on the airman to demonstrate that he is not a
present or potential threat to air safety. Based upon the
philosophical orientation of the Board, even the flimsiest
and most unfounded charges brought by the FAA will not
be dismissed on dispositive motions and will result in an
evidentiary hearing where the ALJ can employ “credibil-
ity” findings against the airman as a means for ruling in
favor of the FAA. Credibility findings of the ALJ are sub-
ject to deference by the Board on appellate review.20 Sim-
ilarly, the Board’s factual findings are conclusive on
appeal to the United States courts of appeals if they are
supported by substantial evidence.21
(2) The second problem is an outgrowth of the first problem:
bias. The Board consistently refuses to sanction the FAA
14 49 C.F.R. § 821.32 (2018).
15 Id. § 44709(d)(1).
16 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(1)(A) (2018).
17 Transcript of Proc. in Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (Sept. 28,
2017) [hereinafter Knight Transcript] (on file with author).
18 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(1)(A) (2018).
19 Id.
20 Chirino v. NTSB, 849 F.2d 1525, 1529–30 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
21 Dillmon v. NTSB, 588 F.3d 1085, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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for misconduct. This is especially true in circumstances
where the FAA has failed to follow its own rules and
guidelines. Since the Board refuses to sanction FAA mis-
conduct, airmen are powerless to obtain a modicum of
due process unless they have the resources to finance ap-
pellate review to the circuit courts of appeals. While the
Board has of late claimed that it lacks jurisdiction to sanc-
tion FAA misconduct, at one time it possessed the resolve
and sense of fairness not to permit FAA misconduct. If
the FAA is guilty of misconduct, it will require an appeal
to a circuit court of appeals to get the Board ruling re-
versed. The Board will refuse to sanction the FAA for vio-
lations of its own rules either claiming it cannot interfere
with the FAA’s “prosecutorial discretion” or that it cannot
or will not reach constitutional issues.
(3) The Board has ignored stare decisis and made it easier
for the FAA to prevail in false statement cases. This, in
turn, has led to airmen being forced to resort to the cir-
cuit courts of appeals. There is no requirement that
Board members be lawyers or have any legal training.
Lawyers understand the difference between “dicta,” lan-
guage not germane or material to a decision, and the
holding of the case, that is, the language that is germane
or material to the decision. The Board’s lack of under-
standing of stare decisis results in it relying on dicta from
one case to reach an improper result in another case.
(4) Related to the third problem mentioned above is the fact
that since the Board does not understand stare decisis, it
does not understand the importance of following prece-
dent or, alternately, if it is going to depart from prece-
dent, the need to articulate a rational basis for doing so.
This lack of understanding by the Board has resulted in
decisions by the circuit courts of appeals reversing the
Board and declaring that the Board has acted in an arbi-
trary and capricious manner contrary to pertinent statu-
tory authority.22
(5) Despite the passage of the Pilots Bill of Rights I, the
Board’s Chief ALJ has ignored and refused to follow the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. Efforts to remediate the conditions at the Board
22 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018).
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have failed. The only recourse is to transfer airmen en-
forcement and certification cases to federal district court.
II. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING A TRANSFER OF
JURISDICTION TO FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
These five systemic and functional issues that prevent the
Board from properly performing its responsibilities as an impar-
tial adjudicator will be explored in the remainder of this article.
A. THE BOARD’S PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS FOR AIR SAFETY
CREATES AN INHERENT CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHICH PREVENTS
IT FROM ACTING AS AN IMPARTIAL ADJUDICATOR IN AVIATION
CERTIFICATE ACTIONS AND ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS
According to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States, “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law[.]”23 The protection of an
airman’s right to due process has been set out in the APA.24
Moreover, there is authority that an airman’s certificate is a pro-
tected property or liberty interest that cannot be taken from
him without affording him due process of law.25 Even in those
circumstances where an airman finds himself before an adminis-
trative agency which may decide whether he can continue to ex-
ercise the privileges of his certificate, the airman has a statutory
right to the matter being adjudicated “in an impartial man-
ner.”26 In contrast to the airman’s constitutional and statutory
protections of due process, we have the statutory authority for
airmen to appeal adverse orders issued by the Administrator of
the FAA to the Board where “the Board may amend, modify, or
reverse the [FAA] order when the Board finds . . . that safety in
air commerce or air transportation and the public interest do
not require affirmation of the order[.]”27 Nothing in the statute
vesting appellate jurisdiction of aviation enforcement proceed-
ings in the Board requires the Board to conduct the proceed-
ings “in an impartial manner.”28 While one would hope that
“safety in air commerce” would be congruous with the due pro-
23 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
24 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557, 558 (2018).
25 White v. Franklin, 637 F. Supp. 601, 610 (N.D. Miss. May 23, 1986); see also
Tamura v. FAA, 675 F. Supp. 1221, 1228 (D. Haw. 1987) (citing White, 637 F.
Supp. at 601).
26 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2018).
27 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(1)(A) (2018).
28 5 U.S.C. § 556(b).
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cess rights of the airman to an adjudication “in an impartial
manner,” experience shows that this is not the case. The Board
does not pretend to be a trial court. It does not pretend to be a
court at all. It is a governmental and policy-making body man-
dated to investigate aviation accidents and ensure air safety, yet
it has the small, isolated, and incompatible additional task of
reviewing FAA enforcement actions against certificate holders. A
review of case law confirms that governmental agencies charged
with protecting the public interest are not focused on the rights
of individuals.29
The adjudication of airman certification in enforcement cases
is a collateral or tangential aspect of the Board’s mission to pro-
mote and ensure air safety. Therefore, it should not be surpris-
ing that the Board has a built-in and systemic bias against
airmen accused of violations of the Federal Aviation Regula-
tions. Nor should it be a surprise that the Board views itself as an
ally of the FAA in a collaborative effort to ensure and promote
air safety in the United States. Moreover, experience shows that
any Board judge assigned to try an airman’s case is not focused
exclusively on the merits of the airman’s case. Rather, as the com-
ments below by Board Chief ALJ Montan˜o demonstrate, an air-
man who raises a novel or unique defense will not have his fate
determined based on the facts of his particular case. Rather,
part of the equation as to whether the airman will be allowed to
prevail depends on what the judge thinks might happen in fu-
ture cases if he decides in favor of the airman and how that
might impact the judge’s ability to be transported safely home
by the airlines.30
Of late, at least one of the Board’s administrative law judges
(ALJs) maintains that he is authorized to cross-examine and in-
terrogate witnesses.31 Since the focus is inevitably cross-examina-
tion of the airman or the airman’s witnesses,32 the nature of a
proceeding before a Board ALJ is inquisitional where the re-
spondent confronts not one, but two, adversaries. Make no mis-
take, the tenor of Board hearings is inquisitional in nature;
there is no pretense that Board hearings are conducted in an
impartial manner33 as required by law.34 Not only will an ALJ
29 See cases cited supra note 6.
30 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 622.
31 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 590.
32 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 590–625.
33 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 590–625.
34 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2018).
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subject the respondent’s expert witness to a grueling cross-ex-
amination in what can only be described as an attempt to negate
the respondent’s affirmative defenses,35 but as Judge Montan˜o
has demonstrated, the ALJ can go much further. For example,
an ALJ, over the objection of respondent’s counsel,36 recalled
via telephone an FAA lay witness,37 who had been excused and
left the city where the hearing was being conducted, and elicited
Rule 70238 opinion testimony, stating that record alterations in
an FAA witness’s medical chart were not material.39
In Administrator v. Knight,40 the Administrator revoked, on an
emergency basis, the airman’s mechanic certificate, claiming he
had refused to provide a urine specimen in response to a De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) drug test. The airman set up
as an affirmative defense that he had been unable to provide the
45mL urine specimen because he suffered from paruresis as di-
agnosed by a board-certified urologist.41 In a moment of re-
markable candor, the following exchange took place between
Board Chief Judge Montan˜o and Dr. Hill, a urologist who testi-
fied on behalf of the respondent:
JUDGE MONTAN˜O: All right. Let me explain something to you,
Doctor. And the reason I’ve asked you so many questions, is that
I have to understand this.
. . . .
JUDGE MONTAN˜O: No, because it is critically important be-
cause I am facing situations in cases w[h]ere people go for drug
tests are pilots, you know, people who are flying for United or
Mr. Knight, you know, doing important work as an A&P
mechanic, insuring we’re safe.
DR. HILL: Yeah, huge.
JUDGE MONTAN˜O: Ensuring we’re all safe when we fly when I
go home on Delta.
DR. HILL: Yeah.
JUDGE MONTAN˜O: —or whatever airline I go home on.
35 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 590–625.
36 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 305–06.
37 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 125–34, 161.
38 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 125–34, 161. Since the ALJ ruled that the
medical review officer was only being considered as a lay witness due to the FAA’s
failure to disclose him as an expert witness, the lay witness was not to sponsor an
opinion “based on scientific, technical, or other specified knowledge within the
scope of Rule 702.” FED. R. EVID. 701(c).
39 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 305–06.
40 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 305–06.
41 Third Amended Answer and Affirmative Defs., Nos. 1–4, Knight, N.T.S.B.
Docket No. SE-30308 (June 23, 2017) (on file with author).
2018] JURISDICTION OVER AIRMEN 265
DR. HILL: Amen.
JUDGE MONTAN˜O: So, its critically important if someone goes
for a drug test and can’t produce urine, and that person can say,
you know—I can look at it this way. I can say, you know, that’s—
Dr. Hill diagnosed it—and I’m not saying I won’t; this is what I’m
weighing. Dr. Hill says, yeah, this one time, doesn’t matter what
happened before, doesn’t matter what happens after; this is what
it was on that one occurrence. Well, I wasn’t there and you
weren’t there. Right?
DR. HILL: Um-hum. Um-hum.
JUDGE MONTAN˜O: Is that right?
DR. HILL: That’s correct.
JUDGE MONTAN˜O: Okay. You didn’t examine him that day?
DR. HILL: I did not.
JUDGE MONTAN˜O: Okay. So, based on everything that you
have made your conclusion on based on his history; correct?
DR. HILL: Correct.
JUDGE MONTAN˜O: Okay. So, then I have to say, okay, well
which do I give the more weight to because—I’m not—you
know, I may very well—well, geez, you know, Dr. Hill was clear.
He was immovable. I believed his testimony. So, future cases,
what would happen is that—could potentially happen is that, you
know, I have paruresis—paruresis.
DR. HILL: Paruresis.
JUDGE MONTAN˜O: Paruresis for day [sic].
DR. HILL: Yeah.
JUDGE MONTAN˜O: You know, that would be the defenses that
would come before me.
DR. HILL: I don’t know.
JUDGE MONTAN˜O: Paruresis for the day. You know, it’s like—
and that’s it. I don’t need to show—
DR. HILL: That’s the new thing.
JUDGE MONTAN˜O: So, that is why it is critical for me to under-
stand. So if I understand your testimony, then that could essen-
tially happen?
DR. HILL: Right.
JUDGE MONTAN˜O: All right. People could take the drug test,
hold their urine, go back and forth in the waiting room, shaking
and can’t wait to come out, and negative dilute. That’s—strike
that. And then come to you or any other urologist, and says, this
is what happened: I have problems at weddings; I have problems
at bar mitzvahs; I have problems when I’m waiting in line. Then
we have paruresis—
DR. HILL: Yeah.
JUDGE MONTAN˜O: —which would serve as a reason for this
person to retain his job and ensure whether or not we fly safely
or a pilot flies us safely. And we’re really not—but then that
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would be the medical—the physiological reason for it; is that
right?42
The comments of Judge Montan˜o must be placed in context.
That exchange between the judge and the physician/expert wit-
ness for the respondent took place following a rigorous and ex-
tremely aggressive cross-examination by the court in an attempt to
persuade the respondent’s expert witness to recant or alter his
opinion testimony.43
The inquisitional tenor of Board proceedings in Knight is con-
firmed by the activities of the ALJ in supplanting and reinforc-
ing the functions of the prosecutor by:
(1) engaging in a 30-minute cross-examination of the re-
spondent’s expert witness,44 raising legal issues that were
not raised by FAA counsel;45
(2) asking respondent’s expert witness leading questions
without a factual basis;46
(3) stating respondent’s counsel was present at a medical
examination when there is no evidence in the record to
support that assertion;47
(4) suggesting that the medical records of the respondent’s
expert were incomplete;48
(5) repeatedly arguing with respondent’s expert witness
about matters of fact that the expert said were not mate-
rial to his decision;49
(6) arguing with respondent’s expert and telling the expert
that he had to answer the questions of the judge;50
(7) repeatedly intoning that respondent went to the expert
for purposes of litigation;51
(8) relating to respondent’s expert that while respondent
would lose his job if the court rejected the “paruresis for
a day defense,” the court was concerned if he sustained
42 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 621–24.
43 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 590–625.
44 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 590–625.
45 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 595–96, 601–03, 607–08, 616–18.
46 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 605.
47 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 610.
48 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 618–20.
49 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 525, 614–15, 617–20.
50 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 620.
51 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 612, 621.
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the defense, other airman would raise that defense and
compromise air safety;52
(9) remediating, over objection of respondent’s counsel, de-
ficiencies in the FAA’s evidence by recalling a lay wit-
ness53 to testify that alterations in the medical records of
an FAA witness did not matter;54
(10) asking, over the objection of respondent’s counsel,55 if
alterations by the FAA examining physician to her
records were material;56
(11) refusing to even consider respondent’s motion in
limine;57
(12) rehabilitating the testimony of the FAA’s examining wit-
ness over the respondent’s objection;58
(13) becoming an advocate for the proposition that unanno-
tated late entries in a shy bladder assessment form were
immaterial59 even though a blank version of that form
had been employed by the FAA as the authentic article
throughout the litigation with a more complete version
of the form only having surfaced twenty-one days before
trial;60
(14) remarking, after respondent’s counsel objected and at-
tempted to curtail the trial court’s advocacy,61 that the
regulations permitted him to ask questions for
clarification;62
(15) advocating on behalf of the FAA’s interests, since when
respondent moved to strike the testimony of the exam-
52 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 621–25.
53 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 125–34, 161.
54 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 303–07.
55 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 305–06.
56 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 303–07.
57 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 27–28.
58 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 197–200, 205, 207, 213–15.
59 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 217, 303–06.
60 Adm’r’s Supplemental Prehearing Submission, Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No.
SE-30308 (Sept. 11, 2017). Under “Exhibits” there was a reference to Exhibit A-6,
a shy bladder assessment form dated August 29, 2016, the version of A-6 to the
Administrator’s Supplemental Prehearing Submission having been materially al-
tered from the genuine form used throughout the litigation. Only after respon-
dent made an issue about the “altered form” by filing emergency motions did the
FAA make a distinction between the original blank form and the supplemental
altered version of the form.
61 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 286–87.
62 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 214.
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ining physician and her medical chart as unreliable,63
the ALJ elicited testimony from the examining physician
and medical review officer that subsequent unannotated
entries in the medical chart did not matter;64
(16) repeatedly accusing respondent’s counsel of claiming
that FAA counsel had altered the shy bladder assessment
form65 when the ALJ’s accusations were not supported
by the record;66
(17) reversing, sub silentio, the ALJ’s prior ruling that the
medical review officer would not be considered as an ex-
pert witness because the FAA had failed to disclose him
as such;67
(18) refusing to permit respondent’s counsel to cross-ex-
amine the FAA’s Deputy Air Surgeon for the Southern
Region about the respondent’s history of difficulty void-
ing in public restrooms68 even though the Deputy Fed-
eral Air Surgeon for the Southern Region testified that
he relied upon the medical history of the examining
physician in reaching his conclusions;69 and
(19) in contrast, the 35-page grueling cross-examination of
the respondent’s expert witness,70 which asked only a
few easy questions for the FAA’s expert witness, the Dep-
uty Federal Air Surgeon for the Southern Region.71
The foregoing facts in the Knight record lead to an inference
that the Chief ALJ had pre-determined his decision before con-
sidering the evidence, a practice condemned in United States ex
rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy.72 Moreover, the extensive remarks by
the Chief ALJ in expressing his concerns for air safety in light of
the “paruresis for a day” defense make the following comments
by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals apt:
Nevertheless, a judge should be careful not to give the impres-
sion that a particular view of the law prevents a careful consider-
63 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 220–22.
64 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 226–28, 303–06.
65 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 19, 226–27.
66 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 19, 226–27.
67 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 125–35, 161, 305–06.
68 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 372–73.
69 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 398–400.
70 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 590–625.
71 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 404–06.
72 347 U.S. 260, 267 (1954) (“We think the petition for habeas corpus charges
the Attorney General with precisely what the regulations forbid him to do: dictat-
ing the Board’s decision.”).
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ation of the law and facts applicable to any given case. When an
entire career has been spent in the service of one governmental
agency, it can be easy for a judge to slip into a stance that may
appear to be advocating, rather than judging, those interests.73
The language employed by the Board and administrative law
judges makes it clear that the Board has a conflict of interest
that precludes it from adjudicating airman certificate actions in
an impartial manner as required by the statute.74 “No man can
serve two masters.”75 The Board is attempting to serve two mas-
ters. It is attempting to promote and serve the interests of air
commerce, air safety, and the public interest and, at the same
time, impartially adjudicate airman enforcement proceedings.
The problem with Congress vesting the jurisdiction of aviation
enforcement proceedings in the Board is that the Board cannot
and will not adjudicate these cases “in an impartial manner” as
required by law.76
The remarks by Chief Judge Montan˜o in Knight demonstrate
that the court was not focused exclusively on Mr. Knight’s guilt or
innocence. While the ALJ announced on the record that he be-
lieved Dr. Hill’s testimony that Knight had paruresis,77 the ALJ
still found in favor of the Administrator, concluding that an air-
man who had provided a 31mL urine sample78 rather than the
required 45mL sample had refused to submit to a DOT drug
test.79 Since the ALJ believed respondent’s expert’s testimony
that respondent suffered from paruresis,80 the only logical basis
for the ALJ’s ruling was, despite that belief, safety in air com-
merce or air transportation and the public interest81 required
affirmation of the order of revocation based on the ALJ’s con-
cern about being safely transported on the airlines.82 The
court’s focus was on how the Board would handle the deluge of
cases that was sure to follow if it rendered a decision favorable to
the respondent.83 The ALJ’s actions and language in Knight un-
derscore the patent conflict of interest presented where the ad-
73 Parchman v. USDA, 852 F.2d 858, 866 (6th Cir. 1988).
74 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2018).
75 Matthew 6:24.
76 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2018).
77 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 68.
78 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 66.
79 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 771–896.
80 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 623.
81 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(1)(A) (2018).
82 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 622.
83 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 621–24.
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judicating agency is charged with adjudicating the guilt or
innocence of an airman and rendering that decision based on
air safety and the public interest.
In addition to the comments by Chief Judge Montan˜o in
Knight, consider In re Rice84 where the Administrator’s counsel
neglected to place into evidence the FAA’s sanction guidance
table that outlined levels of sanction for various infractions of
the Federal Aviation Regulations. While the FAA initially sought
a ninety-day suspension for an off-airport landing due to fuel
exhaustion,85 the law judge reduced the sanction from ninety
days to seventy-five days, and the Board reduced the suspension
to sixty days.86 In rendering its decision, the Board declared: “In
future cases, we encourage the Administrator to present evidence
of the sanction guidance table, and evidence or argument ad-
dressed to the validity of choice of sanctions in the context of
the specific facts of each case.”87
Certainly no one would expect a criminal court to tell the
prosecutor in the presence of defense counsel how to conduct
himself in future cases if he wants to prevail. No one would im-
agine a civil court judge instructing counsel for one of the liti-
gants about how he should conduct himself if he desires to
prevail. Such conduct would be unseemly and would reveal the
clear bias of the court that could lead to the court’s disqualifica-
tion. In court, it would be a gross act of impropriety. Given that
an airman’s loss of license or loss of career is the nature of litiga-
tion before the Board, why are these unseemly and biased com-
ments any more tolerable—just because the Board happens to
be an administrative agency rather than a court? Just as a judge
would be summarily disqualified due to bias in favor of one liti-
gant over the other, so should the Board by virtue of its manifest
bias in favor of the FAA be “disqualified” from adjudicating air-
men certification and enforcement actions. However, that is of
no concern to the Board, since it is an ally of the FAA in pursuit
of ensuring air safety. Moreover, one must remember that the
Board is not a court and, in the context of aviation enforcement
proceedings, the focus of the Board is on “safety in air com-
merce or air transportation and the public interest.”88
84 N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5474, 2009 WL 2844146 (Aug. 26, 2009).
85 Id. at *1.
86 Id.
87 Rice, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5408, 2008 WL 4452143, at *4 n.11 (Sept. 25,
2008) (emphasis added).
88 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(1)(a) (2018).
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The institutional bias that the Board exhibits in favor of the
FAA is also confirmed by the exchange between counsel and the
Board law judge in Shaffer.89 Shaffer’s counsel served discovery
requests on the Administrator for “all radar data showing the
location of N3050H on 30 May 2006.”90 But the FAA only pro-
duced radar data for the flight prior to the aircraft’s return leg
to Homestead, Florida.91 When the FAA had not produced the
radar data by the close of proceedings on Friday, the solution of
the Board ALJ was to have the FAA produce the data on the
following Monday after the airman’s expert witness in the air
traffic control matters would no longer be available to testify.92
The ALJ would not consider dismissing the charges on the
grounds the FAA had not timely produced the radar data not-
ing: “I just don’t see any other way that I can deal with this,
other than to dismiss the case summarily, and I don’t think that
the public interest and air safety in air operation is served by
doing that.”93 On the other hand, a federal district court judge
would have had no difficulty in summarily dismissing the FAA’s
case based on its refusal to produce radar data relevant to the
case in issue. However, because the Board is concerned with
“safety in air commerce or air transportation and the public in-
terest”94 as a public government agency, it cannot and will not
adjudicate airman enforcement actions “in an impartial man-
ner.”95 The Board’s institutional bias toward promoting air
safety precludes it from conducting airman certificate and en-
forcement proceedings “in an impartial manner” as required by
law.96
In Murphy,97 the author moved in limine to preclude the FAA
from entering evidence inconsistent with the Administrator’s
admissions in judicio by virtue of requests for admission to which
the Administrator had failed to respond into the record. The
author noted, “[i]f those admissions are admitted, there is no
89 Transcript of Proc., Shaffer, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-17764 (July 21, 2006)
[hereinafter the Shaffer Transcript] (on file with author).
90 Id. at 723.
91 Id. at 699.
92 Id. at 720–21.
93 Id. at 714.
94 49 C.F.R. § 44709(d)(1)(A) (2018).
95 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2018).
96 Id.
97 Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, at 23, Murphy, N.T.S.B. Order No. 5355,
2008 WL 205095, at *14 n.1 (Jan. 16, 2008) (on file with author).
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case. The case is over.”98 The author requested that he be per-
mitted to read the thirty-five paragraphs of requests for admis-
sion into the record,99 and FAA counsel admitted that no
response or objections to the respondents’ request for admis-
sion had been served.100 In federal district court, the FAA would
have been in serious trouble. The case would have been over for
the FAA. However, Judge Pope of the Board merely directed
that the Administrator’s counsel read into the record his re-
sponses to the request for admission.101 This unorthodox proce-
dure, which is outside the rules of every court, was objected
to.102 There can be little doubt that Judge Pope was reluctant to
grant the motion in limine and declare that the FAA lost the
case by default because he was constrained by concerns for
“safety in air commerce or air transportation and the public
interest.”103
In Administrator v. Roarty,104 the agency sought to revoke an
airman’s certificate alleging that he had made intentionally false
statements on his medical application form by not disclosing a
conviction of driving under the influence.105 After Judge Mullins
found that the airman did not intentionally falsify his medical
application form and exonerated the airman, the Board af-
firmed, declaring: “Unfortunately, the Administrator did not call
any witnesses, and, we think, did not aggressively cross-examine
respondent regarding his exculpatory claims.”106 To be clear,
from the Board’s perspective in Roarty, it was unfortunate that the
Administrator had not aggressively cross-examined the airman.
This is not the kind of language one reads in decisions of trial
courts because trial court judges understand the importance of
both appearing and acting in an impartial manner. The Board
does not. The Board’s support and bias in favor of the FAA is
persistent and in plain public view for all the world to see. If you
were an airman and if proceedings were brought to revoke your
certificate, you would hope the judge’s decision would be based
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 25.
101 Id. at 26–27.
102 Id. at 28–29.
103 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(1)(A) (2018).
104 Roarty, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5261, 2006 WL 3472333, at *1 (Nov. 27,
2006).
105 Id.; see also 14 C.F.R. § 67.403(a)(1) (2009) (prohibiting making fraudulent
or intentionally false statements on an application for a medical certificate).
106 Roarty, 2006 WL 3472333, at *2 (emphasis added).
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upon the merits of your case and not a concern about what
might happen in future cases in the event you were to prevail.
Unhappily, that is not the case. As demonstrated by the remarks
of Chief Judge Montan˜o, the bias the Board exhibits in favor of
the FAA renders the Board an improper forum to adjudicate
airman certificate action and enforcement cases.
B. THE BOARD, AN INSTITUTION OPENLY BIASED IN FAVOR OF
THE FAA, CONSISTENTLY REFUSES TO SANCTION FAA
MISCONDUCT, RENDERING IT AN IMPROPER FORUM TO
ADJUDICATE AIRMEN ENFORCEMENT AND CERTIFICATION CASES
As if manifest and open bias on the part of the Board in favor
of the FAA is not alone sufficient grounds for transferring juris-
diction of airman certificate actions from the Board to federal
district court, the Board has also demonstrated a propensity to
ignore violations by the Administrator of his own rules, proce-
dures, and protocols. For example, in Administrator v. Murphy,107
where the captain and first officer were represented by the au-
thor, a Lear jet momentarily departed from its cruising altitude
of 26,000 feet to less than 26,300 feet when there was a Canadair
CRJ-2 aircraft within 3.4 nautical miles laterally at an altitude of
27,000 feet.108 The captain, upon detecting this altitude devia-
tion, directed the co-pilot to descend to 26,000 feet.109 The par-
ties stipulated it was a computer-detected altitude deviation.110
The en route separation was 1,000 feet vertically with five miles
lateral separation.111 Because vertical separation had been com-
promised by more than 20%, the data blocks on the aircraft be-
gan to flash on the controller’s radar scope even though there
was no suggestion of mid-air collision anywhere in the evidence
or in the transcript.112
FAA Enforcement Bulletin 86-1 was in place at the time of the
incident as an Appendix to the FAA Enforcement Handbook,
requiring the matter be resolved administratively if it involved
(1) a computer-detected altitude deviation; (2) of 500 feet or
less; (3) where there was no mid-air collision; (4) where there
were no aggravating circumstances; and (5) where the pilot did
107 Murphy, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5355, 2008 WL 205095, at *1 (Jan. 16,
2008).
108 Id. at *1, *7.




274 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [83
not have a history of committing an altitude deviation in the
past five years.113 Both airmen in Murphy met all of the criteria
set forth in the bulletin.114 Judge Pope found in favor of the
airmen, concluding that the criteria of Bulletin No. 86-1 were
satisfied and that the FAA was bound by its own regulations, pol-
icies, and procedures, citing a number of cases.115 The FAA ap-
pealed the adverse decision, and the Board reversed concluding
it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the FAA’s prosecutorial
discretion.116
In Administrator v. Moshea,117 the airman appealed from a fifty-
day suspension of his airline transport pilot certificate after
Judge Geraghty affirmed violations stating that the airman had
operated an aircraft in an unairworthy condition.118 Moshea had
flown the subject aircraft operated by Key Lime on multiple oc-
casions, had experienced difficulty with the landing gear, had
disclosed this to maintenance personnel, but had not made an
entry in the aircraft logbook.119 When a different pilot flying this
aircraft had a severe landing gear problem to such an extent
that the pilot diverted to an airport with crash, fire, and rescue
services, Key Lime promptly notified the FAA, making a “self-
disclosure” in accordance with FAA Advisory Circular AC 00-58,
and asserting that the incident was caused by “lack of communi-
cation between the pilot and maintenance.”120 The FAA did not
pursue action against Key Lime but did pursue enforcement ac-
tion against Moshea.121 Judge Geraghty found that the Board
lacked jurisdiction to review how the FAA implements AC 00-
58.122
On appeal, Moshea argued that Judge Geraghty erred in rul-
ing that the Board does not have jurisdiction to review the Ad-
ministrator’s discretion to pursue enforcement actions, arguing
“that the Administrator violated his policy in pursuing action,
thereby violating respondent’s fundamental due process
113 Id. at *2.
114 Id.
115 Id. at *14 (citing Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Steenholdt v. FAA,
314 F.3d 633 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Lopez v. FAA, 318 F.3d 242, 249 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
Brasher, 5 N.T.S.B. 2116 (1987); Randall, 3 N.T.S.B. 3624 (1981)).
116 Murphy, 2008 WL 205095, at *4.
117 N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5328, 2007 WL 3088248 (Oct. 17, 2007).
118 Id. at *1; 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.7(a), 135.65(b), 91.13(a) (2018).
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rights.”123 The Board affirmed Judge Geraghty’s Initial Decision
denying Moshea the affirmative defense based upon AC 00-58,
declaring:
The Board has previously held that it does not have the authority
to review the Administrator’s determination to pursue a matter
through legal enforcement action. The Board is precluded from
deciding a case based on the Administrator’s choice of pursuing
an action against an individual. Such an action would intrude
upon the Administrator’s prosecutorial discretion. The Board’s
“jurisdiction concerning enforcement proceedings extends only
to the question of whether safety and public interest require affir-
mation of the Administrator’s order.”124
In Moshea v. NTSB,125 Moshea appealed the Board’s ruling
that it lacks jurisdiction over the FAA’s prosecutorial discretion
in terms of sanctions, or lack thereof, expressed in AC 00-58.126
At the time of the appeal, 49 C.F.R. § 44709(d)(3) still existed
and provided that the Board was
not bound by findings of facts of the Administrator but is bound
by all validly adopted interpretations of laws and regulations the
Administrator carries out and of written agency policy guidance
available to the public related to sanctions to be imposed under this
section unless the Board finds an interpretation is arbitrary, ca-
pricious, or otherwise not according to law.127
The Board took the position that AC 00-58 was not “related to
sanctions” under the then codified § 44709(d)(3), an argument
the D.C. Circuit summarily rejected. The court noted:
We find unreasonable the efforts of the FAA and the Board to
evade Circular 00-58 in this way. Without getting into a metaphys-
ical discussion of the meaning of the phrase “related to,” it suf-
fices here to say that the words “related to” are broad . . . And we
think a Circular that says no sanction will be imposed in the case
of voluntary disclosure is quite obviously “related to sanctions.”
We conclude that the Board’s analysis was unreasonable and con-
trary to the statute.128
123 Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
124 Id.
125 570 F.3d 349 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
126 Id. at 351.
127 Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44709 (d)(3)) (emphasis in original).
128 Id. at 352 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307–08 (1995)
(“Congress did not delineate the scope of ‘related to’ jurisdiction, but its choice
of words suggests a grant of some breadth.”)).
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The Board suggested, but did not rule, that Moshea may not
have satisfied the requirements of the Advisory Circular.129 The
D.C. Circuit reversed for a second reason, declaring:
The Board’s analysis suffers from a separate flaw that also re-
quires vacatur. The Board’s position in Moshea’s case is inconsis-
tent with his handling of a prior case. In Liotta, the Board
allowed an employee of an air carrier to assert an “affirmative
defense” based on Advisory Circular 00-58. Liotta, NTSB No. EA-
5297, slip op. at 6, 2007 WL 1920600 (June 27, 2007). In Liotta,
the Board thus exercised its jurisdiction to consider an affirma-
tive defense virtually identical to Moshea’s. By departing from
the Liotta precedent without explanation, the Board here acted
in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Cf. Ramaprakash v. FAA,
346 F.3d 1121, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“An agency’s failure to
come to grips with conflicting precedent constitutes an inexcus-
able departure from the essential requirement of reasoned deci-
sion making.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Board’s
inconsistent treatment of Moshea’s case and Liotta’s case sup-
plies an independent basis for vacating the Board’s Order in this
case.130
In remanding the case to the Board, the court declared: “The
Board had jurisdiction to decide whether the FAA’s suspension
of Moshea comported with the FAA’s voluntary disclosure policy
set forth in Advisory Circular 00-58.”131
While a review of Administrator v. Liotta132 indicates that the
respondent was ultimately unsuccessful in his effort to persuade
the Board that he met the requirements of AC 00-58, nonethe-
less, in that case, the airman was allowed a defense based upon
that advisory circular. In Moshea, this was not allowed, nor was it
allowed in Murphy. The holding in Moshea v. NTSB clearly indi-
cates that had Murphy had the resources to take an appeal to the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals, he would have prevailed,
since the FAA Enforcement Bulletin 86-1 did relate to sanc-
tion.133 Aside from being invalid, as demonstrated by the hold-
ing of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Moshea v. NTSB, the Board’s position that it lacks
129 Id. at 351.
130 Id. at 352–53.
131 Id. at 353.
132 Liotta, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5297, 2007 WL 1920600 (June 29, 2007).
133 Moshea v. NTSB, 570 F.3d 349, 352 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“And we think that a
Circular that says no sanction will be imposed in the case of voluntary disclosure
is quite obviously ‘related to sanctions.’ We conclude that the Board’s analysis was
unreasonable and contrary to the statute.”).
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jurisdiction over the Administrator’s “prosecutorial discretion”
is a concept of recent invention.134
In Administrator v. Randall,135 the airman was alleged to have
banked a North American Sabreliner beyond eighty degrees and
to have stressed the aircraft to a load of +5.27Gs on several occa-
sions.136 The Administrator brought an emergency order of rev-
ocation against the respondent’s airline transport pilot
certificate, the case having been tried before Judge Fowler, who
reduced the sanction to a nine-month suspension.137 During the
hearing, the respondent had repeatedly objected to the admis-
sion of flight data recorder (FDR) tapes because FAA Order
2150.3 dated May 16, 1980 provided:
Flight recorder tapes will not be utilized as a means to discover
violations when the FAA has no other evidence of possible viola-
tion; and flight recorder tapes will not be used as evidence in an
FAA enforcement action except for the purpose of corroborating
other available evidence or to resolve conflicting evidence.138
The Board granted the airman’s appeal reversing the initial
decision and the emergency order of revocation, declaring:
The fact that the Administrator may be authorized to use FDR
tapes in an enforcement proceeding does not, as the law judge
appears to have assumed, entitle him to disregard a policy he has
adopted, as a matter of his prosecutorial discretion, to restrict
the use of such tapes in an enforcement action. Such a claim of
entitlement would draw in question the most elementary princi-
ples of due process, for it would presume to reserve to the Ad-
ministrator the authority to arbitrarily confer upon or deny any
individual an important benefit. The Supreme Court has refused
to sanction an agency’s noncompliance with its procedural rules
even in instances where the only individuals who could benefit
from them were the agency’s own employees and even thought
the adoption of the rules was a purely discretionary exercise of
authority. We think it follows that a policy that applies to any
individual who may be subject to FAA enforcement action cannot
be ignored on the claim that it involves general, internal agency
134 See Austin, N.T.S.B. Docket No. EA-5610, 2011 WL 7061940, at *1 (Dec. 21,
2011) (citing Moshea v. FAA, 570 F.3d 349 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). The Board directed
the ALJ to “accept briefs, evidence and/or testimony on the issue of whether the
Board has jurisdiction to review the ASAP program and its applicability to this
case.”
135 Randall, 3 N.T.S.B. 3624 (1981).
136 Id. at 3624.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 3625.
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guidance. Moreover, such a claim cannot be reconciled with the
explicit instruction in Order 2150.3 that “FAA legal counsel shall
not use flight recorder data as evidence, in any FAA enforcement
action, except to corroborate other available evidence of a possi-
ble violation, or to resolve conflicting evidence.”
The absence of articulated reasons within Order 2150.3 itself for
departing from the FDR tape policy in a specific case creates the
potential for capricious application which can only be avoided
or, in this case, remedied, by giving the policy as written full
force and effect in our proceedings. Since the Administrator
sponsored no evidence independent of the FDR tapes to estab-
lish the alleged violations, the initial decision and the order of
revocation cannot stand.139
Moreover, in footnote five of the opinion, the Board declared:
“In Administrator v. Montgomery, et al., NTSB Order No. EA-1397
(1990), we rejected the contention that the Administrator’s
prosecutorial discretion included the right to depart from the
policy or guidelines he had established through adoption of the
Aviation Safety Reporting Program.”140
Clearly, in 1980 and 1981, as evidenced by Montgomery and
Randall, the Board did have jurisdiction to prevent the FAA from
violating its own rules and did not create the fiction that it
lacked jurisdiction to question the Administrator’s prosecutorial
discretion. This invention gives the Administrator wide latitude
to violate his own rules and places the airman at a pronounced
disadvantage before an adjudicator that does not care and is in-
different. Because the Board clings to the invention that it lacks
jurisdiction to question the Administrator’s prosecutorial discre-
tion when the Administrator violates his own rules, the Board is
an improper forum to adjudicate airman enforcement and cer-
tificate actions, and these matters should be transferred to the
jurisdiction of federal district courts.
139 Id. at 3626 (internal citations omitted).
140 Id. at 3631, n.5.
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C. THE BOARD HAS ROUTINELY DEPARTED FROM PRECEDENT
AND LOWERED THE FAA’S BURDEN OF PROOF IN FALSE
STATEMENT CASES REQUIRING AIRMEN TO PURSUE APPEALS TO
THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL, RESULTING IN
FINDINGS BY THE COURTS THAT THE BOARD ACTED IN AN
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS MANNER OR DEPARTED FROM
PRECEDENT WITHOUT EXPLANATION
Perhaps no area of Board case law is fraught with more uncer-
tainty, confusion, and disarray than the body of the law the
Board has created in adjudicating charges brought by the FAA
asserting that an airman made “a fraudulent or intentionally
false statement.”141 Because of the byzantine and confusing na-
ture of this area of the law, the reader may anticipate that this
portion of this article will be somewhat protracted in scope. The
author apologizes, in advance, for the length of this portion of
the article. However, without a comprehensive review of Board
precedent, the reader will not have a complete appreciation for
all the machinations the Board has pursued to lower the FAA’s
burden of proof in false statement cases and put in place what is
in effect a standard of strict liability necessitating an adverse de-
cision to the airman any time there is proof the statement was
false and the airman knew it, without regard to the airman’s sub-
jective state of mind and whether he believed he was required to
disclose the information in response to an unambiguous
question.
We begin our journey with Administrator v. Hart,142 where a
tired and exhausted flight instructor inattentively made entries
in his students’ flight records about flight instruction that never
took place.143 Judge Moorhead found that the entries were in-
tentionally false but not fraudulent and affirmed an order of
revocation.144 On appeal, the Board found the proper sanction
was a nine-month suspension, concurring with Judge Moor-
head’s assessment that the entries were not fraudulent but were
made with knowledge of the character of the document and the
141 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 67.403(a) (2018) (“No person may make or cause to be
made—(1) [a] fraudulent or intentionally false statement on any application for
a medical certificate[.]”); 14 C.F.R. § 43.12(a) (2018) (“No person may make or
cause to be made: (1) Any fraudulent or intentionally false entry in any record or
report that is required to be made, kept, or used to show compliance with any
requirement under this part[.]”).
142 Hart, 2 N.T.S.B. 828 (1974).
143 Id. at 828–29.
144 Id. at 828.
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nature of the data being endorsed.145 Accordingly, the airman’s
appeal was granted in part, and denied in part.146 Hart’s petition
for reconsideration was denied.147
Hart v. McLucas148 is the seminal case relied on in practice
before the Board when dealing with the difference between
fraudulent and false statements. Hart appealed to the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals which found that the language in the reg-
ulations dealing with “fraudulent or intentionally false”
statements dealt with the concept of fraud, i.e., “(1) a false rep-
resentation (2) in reference to a material fact (3) made with
knowledge of its falsity (4) and with intent to deceive (5) with
action taken in reliance upon the representation.”149 A false
statement charge is a lesser included offense that requires proof
of “falsity, materiality and knowledge.”150 The fundamental issue
raised by Hart on appeal was whether he had subjective knowl-
edge of the falsity. In reversing the Board, the Ninth Circuit
declared:
The FAA argues that knowledge of falsity is not a required ele-
ment for intentional false statement under § 61.59(a)(2). While
the NTSB agreed with that construction of § 61.59(a)(2), we do
not. And, indeed, at oral argument, attorneys for the govern-
ment disavowed the NTSB’s interpretation of § 61.59(a)(2).
In effect, the FAA and NTSB would interpret § 61.59(a)(2) as
establishing strict liability: the making of a false statement would
be punishable, under their interpretation of § 61.59(a)(2), even
if the person who made the statement did not know the state-
ment to be false.
The obvious problem with this interpretation is that it effectively
construes the term “intentionally” out of the regulation. The use
of the word “intentionally,” however, must be assumed to impart
a mens rea requirement to the regulation. Were this not so, the
draftsman of § 61.59(a)(2) could have defined the offense as the
making of a false statement without any reference to the mental
state of the person who makes the entry. Since, however,
§ 61.59(a)(2) explicitly includes an intent requirement, it is in-
consistent to read the regulation as establishing strict liability.
. . . .
145 Id. at 829.
146 Id. at 830.
147 Id. at 836.
148 535 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1976).
149 Id. at 519.
150 Id.
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In short, the administrative interpretation of § 61.59(a)(2) ad-
vanced below, which essentially establishes a strict liability of-
fense, is incorrect since it violates the common and normal
reading of the phrase “intentionally false.” A fair reading of
§ 61.59(a)(2) indicates a desire to require scienter, i.e., knowl-
edge of falsity, for liability. If the FAA thinks it would be better to
establish strict liability, it is free to seek amendment to the
regulation.151
The Ninth Circuit noted, “neither Judge Moorhead nor the
[Board] squarely addressed the issue of Hart’s knowledge of fal-
sity.”152 The Ninth Circuit, in remanding the case to the Board,
made this very telling remark:
Possibly the judge and the NTSB sought to spare Hart the oblo-
quy of the direct finding, although there are indications that the
administrative law judge and the NTSB believed that Hart was
unaware of the falsity of the entries he made. Certainly, that is
one possible interpretation of the finding that the false entries
were the result of “inattention.”
However, there are other comments by the NTSB which may be
interpreted to the contrary. In particular, the NTSB said (some-
what obliquely) that Hart knew “the nature of the data he was
signing.” Does this mean that Hart knew the entries were false?
We do not know.
In short, the finding of the NTSB on the issue of knowledge is
understandably ambiguous because the NTSB incorrectly
thought that knowledge was not a requisite element for a viola-
tion of § 61.59(a)(2).153
A casual reading of the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Hart
makes it clear that the question of “knowledge” on the part of
the airman extends not merely to “the nature of the data he was
signing,”154 but to whether the airman “knew the entries were
false.”155 In other words, the area of inquiry on the third ele-
ment of a false statement case, the question of knowledge, de-
pends upon the subjective understanding and intent of the
airman to report the data.156
151 Id. at 519–20.
152 Id. at 520.
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Following remand from the Ninth Circuit to the Board, the
Board in Administrator v. Hart157 dismissed the complaint and
terminated the proceedings, reasoning “that a presumption of
actual knowledge on the part of respondent at the time of his
false entry was amply rebutted, so that no scienter had been estab-
lished.”158 However, the FAA petitioned for reconsideration and
the Board issued a briefing schedule to allow the parties to brief
the issue of scienter.159
In Administrator v. Hart,160 the Board, once again, dismissed
the complaint and terminated proceedings after considering
the parties’ briefs, declaring:
The hearing examiner found that respondent’s falsity was most
probably the result of inattention. We agree with that finding
and our rereading of the record has not changed our opinion.
We are impressed, moreover, with the argument of respondent
that it is impossible to be inattentive and at the same time have
actual knowledge of an act performed.161
The Board, after searching the record, commented:
[W]e agree with the Administrator that it is almost impossible to
establish a past state of mind of another person, particularly
when he disagrees. But, in accordance with the court’s decision
in this case, we think that circumstantial evidence on that issue
must be so compelling that no other determination is reasonably
possible. We do not find that the record supports any such com-
pelling determination. Rather, it is our view that the record, as a
whole, indicates that the Administrator has not borne the bur-
den of proving scienter as required by the Court of Appeals.162
A casual reading of the Board’s pronouncement in Administra-
tor v. Hart makes it clear that merely establishing that an airman
knew a fact does not mean that the airman acted with subjective
knowledge. Moreover, “it is almost impossible to establish a past
state of mind of another person, particularly when he dis-
agrees.”163 No one reading this language by the Board would
imagine that the Board would sanction motions for summary
judgment. No person reading this language by the Board would
imagine that the Board would employ and approve the doctrine
157 2 N.T.S.B. 841 (1976).
158 Id. at 841.
159 Id.
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that if the airman knew the data, he acted with knowledge suffi-
cient to satisfy a false statement charge. No one would imagine
that the Board would lay down a doctrine that “inattention”
would not be a defense in future cases, especially when this was a
factor in the Board’s decision in Hart. As we shall see in the
discussion below, the Board labored diligently to resurrect the
strict liability standard and make it easier for the Administrator
to prevail on false statement charges. More disturbing, however,
is the fact that the Board departed from its own precedent with-
out ever acknowledging or admitting that it was doing so.
Administrator v. Juliao164 was decided only thirteen years after
the Board’s decision in Hart. Consequently, the Board had not
yet disavowed the requirement of subjective knowledge as a con-
dition to the Administrator proving a false statement charge. Ju-
liao had been convicted of attempting to transport
approximately $100,000 in currency to Columbia, South
America.165 Approximately six months after his conviction, Ju-
liao completed a medical application form and gave a negative
response to Question 21w, “Medical History—Have you ever had
or have you now any of the following: Record of other convic-
tions.”166 Judge Reilly affirmed the FAA’s order revoking Juliao’s
airman certificate concluding that “respondent had intention-
ally falsified two medical certificate applications.”167 Harking
back to the decision in Hart, where the entries in the students’
logbooks were arguably the result of “inattention,” Juliao testi-
fied his entries on the medical application forms were due to
“his inadvertent failure to read them closely[.]”168 Juliao looked
at the list of questions under “Medical History” on the form ask-
ing for questions about heart problems and similar problems
and concluded “I don’t have—haven’t ever had any medical
problems, so I just went down the line with Xs on the no, both
lines, and then I finish real quick, and next I started with the
rest of the questions.”169 Judge Reilly “made no credibility find-
ings because he concluded . . . that respondent’s explanation
for the wrong answers was inadequate as a matter of law.”170 The
164 7 N.T.S.B. 94 (1990).
165 Id. at 94.
166 Id. at 94–95.
167 Id. at 94.
168 Id. at 95.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 94, 95.
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Board reversed Judge Reilly and remanded the case for further
proceedings, declaring:
The conclusion was erroneous because actual knowledge of the
falsity of an entry is required to establish a violation of section
61.20(a)(1). In other words, while the law judge, by rejecting re-
spondent’s testimony, could have inferred an intent to falsify
from the fact that the applications were shown to contain incor-
rect information, he could not ignore the respondent’s testi-
mony and find an intent to falsify in a breach of the respondent’s
perceived duty to know what information the application was in
fact seeking. It is not enough, under the regulation, to show that
a respondent should have known. Rather, the proof, either di-
rectly or circumstantially, must show what he knew.171
The holding of the Board in Juliao clearly reinforced the hold-
ing in Hart that in order for the Administrator to prevail, it must
show not only that the information was false and that the airman
knew it was false but also that the airman knew he had a duty to
disclose the information in response to the question. Further-
more, Juliao makes it clear that “inattention” can be a defense in
a false statement case, and there was no Board case law at that
time declaring that the failure of the airman to read the instruc-
tions on the Medical Application Form deprived him of the de-
fense that he did not act with subjective knowledge as
specifically held by the Ninth Circuit in Hart v. McLucas.
In United States v. Manapat,172 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s sua sponte
decision to dismiss charges against the airman brought under 18
U.S.C. § 1001 in connection with allegedly “knowingly and will-
fully” making false statements on the FAA Medical Application
Form. Questions 22 and 23 under the heading “Medical His-
tory” dealt with “record of traffic convictions” and “record of
other convictions.”173 The district court, in dismissing the indict-
ment, made these telling remarks on the record:
I have determined that it is a matter of fundamental fairness.
And the way their question has been put on this form, which is
basically to determine medical conditions, is fundamentally un-
fair; that the way it is put is vague. It is misleading and confusing.
It is ambiguous, and the way it is configured on the form
amounts to a trick question; and I think it is fundamentally un-
fair to base a felony prosecution on any answers that may be
171 Id. at 96 (citations omitted).
172 928 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1991).
173 Id. at 1098–99.
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given by anybody on this form. And it is so fundamentally unfair
that it amounts to a denial of due process.174
Circuit Judge Kravitch on the Eleventh Circuit Panel wrote:
It is conceivable that an applicant might believe that the form
was asking for convictions somehow related to medical condi-
tions. Or, an applicant could fail to understand the importance
of such questions on a form concerning medical conditions and
simply not give proper thought before answering. Or, more
likely, an applicant in generally good health could routinely
check off the many items on the standardized form without read-
ing them carefully, resulting in an inaccurate response.
Although the single statements “Record of traffic convictions,” or
“Record of other convictions” may not be ambiguous standing
alone, they become quite confusing when buried in a list headed
“Medical History” and purportedly concerned with medical con-
ditions. Several courts have stated that “[a] defense to a charge
of perjury may not be established by isolating a statement from
context, giving it in this manner a meaning entirely different
from that which it has when the testimony is considered as a
whole.” This principle applies equally to prosecutions as well as
defenses. In order to successfully prosecute an indictment for
making a false statement, the government must not remove ques-
tions from the context in which their answers were given in an
attempt to prove their clarity.
Members of our society are often asked to fill out standardized
forms containing large numbers of general background ques-
tions. Such forms, usually hastily completed in waiting rooms,
rarely require critical information that, if inaccurate, could result
in criminal prosecution. If these forms do require such critical
information, unwary citizens should be able to expect that impor-
tant questions will not be hidden in laundry lists of unrelated
topics. Unlike other crimes, the crime of making a false state-
ment is unique in that there is no separately demonstrable actus
reus. The actus reus and the mens rea unite into a single inquiry:
Did the defendant know the statement was false when made?
When the question that lead to the allegedly false response is
fundamentally ambiguous, we cannot allow juries to criminally
convict a defendant based on their guess as to what the defen-
dant was thinking at the time the response was made.175
Within two years of the decision in Manapat, the Board was
working diligently on behalf of the FAA to make it less burden-
some for the Administrator to prevail over airmen in false state-
174 Id. at 1099.
175 Id. at 1101 (citations omitted).
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ment charges. In Administrator v. Sue,176 the airman did not
report two convictions of driving while intoxicated on his Medi-
cal Application Form.177 Judge Geraghty reduced an order of
revocation to an eleven-month suspension of the airman’s com-
mercial pilot certificate after Judge Geraghty found that “he did
know . . . that what they were asking on the form he should have
said yes to.”178 The Board remarked, “We agree with respondent
that a finding of violation requires actual knowledge of the false
statement, and that is not enough that a respondent should
have known that an entry was false.”179 In granting the Adminis-
trator’s appeal and order of revocation of the respondent’s air-
man and medical certificates, the Board declared:
We also affirm the law judge’s finding that the Administrator met
his burden of proof on the falsification charge, and thereby re-
ject respondent’s contention that there was no evidence that re-
spondent had actual knowledge that his statements were false.
Respondent testified that he had read the form. In fact, in re-
sponse to the law judge’s questioning, respondent acknowledged
that he looked at the form to see the questions that were being
asked, that he had read the question asking for traffic conviction
information and he “just didn’t feel it was pertinent.” With this
testimony, the law judge had sufficient evidence to uphold this
count of the complaint.180
With all due respect, this pronouncement by the Board was
wrong for a least two reasons. The first reason the pronounce-
ment was wrong is because knowledge that the statement was
false is not the relevant standard. The standard is whether the
airman harbored a subjective intent that a proper response to
the question was to disclose the data. This was the Board’s hold-
ing in Juliao. Secondly, the airman testified that he didn’t feel
the data was pertinent to the question. Again, harking back to
the Board’s decision in Hart, “in accordance with the Court’s
decision in this case, we think that circumstantial evidence on
that issue must be so compelling that no other determination is
reasonably possible.”181 Not only does it appear that the Board
applied the incorrect standard in Sue but also, in order to lower
the Administrator’s burden of proof and decrease the level of




180 Id. (citations omitted).
181 Hart, 3 N.T.S.B. 24, 26 (1977) (citation omitted).
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due process airmen could receive in enforcement proceedings,
the Board made the following statement:
Respondent also argues, in connection with the § 67.20 finding,
that the medical application is too vague to support a finding of
intentional falsification and that the questions regarding traffic
or other convictions exceed the Administrator’s legitimate inter-
ests. In support, respondent claims that the FAA has admitted
the form to be vague and notes that a U.S. District Court so held
(United States v. Manapat, Case No. 88-325-Cr-T-13(a) (U.S.D.C.
Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, December 12,
1988)).
We have already dismissed the Administrator’s motion, predi-
cated on Manapat, for expedited review. NTSB Order No. EA-
3430 (1991). In that order, we addressed in detail the subsequent
decision on review by the Court of Appeals in United States v.
Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097 (11th Circ. 1991). We there determined
that Manapat is not controlling and does not require a finding
that the medical application was vague. We also specifically
found that, despite their placement under the heading “Medical
History,” the two questions about traffic and other convictions
are not confusing to a person of ordinary intelligence. We espe-
cially noted that the key questions determinative of whether an
application was vague as applied—respondent’s knowledge and
intent—would be determined by the law judge at the hearing.182
Once again, with all due respect, the Board appears to have
acted improperly. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit made a finding that placing questions about
driving convictions under a laundry list of “Medical History” ren-
dered the form not merely vague, but “fundamentally ambigu-
ous.”183 Another reason the Board’s decision is disturbing is
because the decision in Manapat was based upon due process,
constitutional grounds, and the trial court’s finding that the
form was “fundamentally unfair.”184 Since the basis of the Elev-
enth Circuit decision in Manapat was constitutional concern for
due process, it is ironic that the Board rejected a constitutional,
due process attack on the Medical Form, especially since the
Board routinely takes the position that its jurisdiction does not
182 Sue, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3877, 1993 WL 157467, at *2 (Apr. 28, 1993).
183 United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097, 1101 (11th Cir. 1991) (“When the
question that led to the allegedly false response is fundamentally ambiguous, we
cannot allow juries to criminally convict a defendant based on their guess as to
what the defendant was thinking at the time the response was made.”).
184 Id. at 1099.
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extend to constitutional issues.185 The Board’s pronouncement
that it would not follow the Eleventh Circuit holding in Manapat
and would allow law judges to rule on the airman’s state of mind
is further disturbing for the reason that the assessment of the
judges would be nothing more than speculation. The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals noted, “we cannot allow juries to crimi-
nally convict a defendant based on their guess as to what the
defendant was thinking at the time the response was made.”186
Accordingly, the Board, which does not reach constitutional is-
sues, unilaterally decided it would reject Manapat and allow
judges to “guess” at what the respondent was thinking. Regretta-
bly, the Board’s decision in Sue was affirmed in an unpublished
disposition.187 As the reader will appreciate from discussions set
forth below, the Board’s articulation of the wrong standard in
Sue, together with its rejection of the holding in Manapat and its
finding that law judges can guess about the state of mind of air-
men, allows the FAA to reap dividends in the future since the
Sue case is cited by the Board for the proposition that questions
on the Medical Application Form were “not confusing to a per-
son of ordinary intelligence.”188
In order for the Board to lower the FAA’s burden of proof in
false statement cases, to make it easier and simpler for the FAA
to prevail, and to eliminate defenses airmen could employ in an
effort to prevent the FAA from revoking their certificates, the
Board continued its retreat from the ruling in Hart v. McLucas189
where the airman’s subjective state of mind was declared to be a
requirement to proving “knowledge” in the context of false
statement charges.190 In Administrator v. Boardman,191 the Board
covertly worked to undermine the pronouncement in Adminis-
trator v. Hart192 where the Board admitted “that it is almost im-
possible to establish a past state of mind of another person,
185 Lybyer, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4822, 2000 WL 193000, at *1 (Feb. 10, 2000)
(“[W]e do not have jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of regulations is-
sued by the Administrator or the Secretary of the Department of Transporta-
tion.”) (citation omitted).
186 Manapat, 928 F.2d at 1101.
187 Sue v. NTSB, 8 F.3d 30 (9th Cir. 1993).
188 Sue, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3877, 1993 WL 157467, at *2 (Apr. 28, 1993).
189 535 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1976).
190 Id. at 520.
191 Boardman, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4515, 1996 WL 748190, at *7 (Dec. 20,
1996).
192 Hart, 3 N.T.S.B. 24 (1977).
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particularly when he disagrees.”193 It also quietly overruled, sub
silentio, its holding in Administrator v. Juliao,194 where the Board
recognized that inattentiveness on the part of the airman could
negate the FAA’s claim that the airman had actual knowledge of
the falsity.195 In Boardman, Judge Fowler reversed an emergency
order revoking the airman’s medical certificates based upon an
alleged violation of § 67.20(a) of the Federal Aviation Regula-
tions, i.e., knowingly making a fraudulent or intentionally false
statement on a Medical Application Form.196 Even though Judge
Fowler made a credibility assessment in favor of the airman, and
even though it was “the Board’s policy not to disturb a credibil-
ity finding ‘unless there is a compelling reason for the finding
was clearly erroneous,’”197 the Board, sub silentio, overruled its
holding in Administrator v. Hart.198 It also overruled its holding
in Administrator v. Juliao199 by declaring that the failure of an
airman to carefully read the form could be a defense in a false
statement case. The respondent in Boardman admitted that he
placed the wrong answer in response to the question concern-
ing a history of non-traffic convictions, but testified that his ac-
tions were “the result of an inadvertent mistake, borne out of
haste, not an effort to hide the convictions from the Administra-
tor.”200 While a lack of attentiveness was recognized as a basis for
making an erroneous entry in both Hart v. McLucas and Adminis-
trator v. Juliao, the Board, in rejecting Judge Fowler’s credibility
assessment that the airman did not harbor the intent to make an
intentionally false entry on his Medical Application Form,
declared:
Before discussing our reasons for believing that the respondent
purposefully falsified his medical certificate application, some
comment is warranted on the defense the law judge concluded
exonerated the respondent of the intentional falsification
charge; namely, that accountability for erroneous answers on the
application could be avoided if the respondent did not actually
read the questions to which they corresponded. We are troubled
by such a ruling.
193 Boardman, 1996 WL 748190 at *7; Hart, 3 N.T.S.B. at 24.
194 Juliao, 7 N.T.S.B. 94, 96 (1990).
195 Id. at 96.
196 Id.
197 Chirino v. NTSB, 849 F.2d 1525, 1529–30 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
198 Hart, 3 N.T.S.B. at 24, 26.
199 Juliao, 7 N.T.S.B. at 96.
200 Boardman, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4515, 1996 WL 748190, at *1 (Dec. 20,
1996).
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The very act of submitting a medical certificate application in-
vites reliance by the FAA on the responses it contains, and the
nature of the responses, every airman can be fairly presumed to
appreciate, dictates whether the certificate will be issued. It
seems to us that an airman who, knowing this, tenders an appli-
cation that turns out to have a wrong answer to one or more of
many questions he freely chose not to even read, much less to
thoughtfully answer, cannot reasonably argue that he lacked the
intent to give false information, for the submission of inaccurate
information is a natural and foreseeable consequence of com-
pleting an application in a manner that essentially guarantees its
unreliability. We think that such an airman, having acted in a
manner that could be viewed as evincing a willful disregard of
the truth or falsity of the information officially submitted and,
therefore, in a way reflecting contempt for the airman medical
certification process, should be determined to have intended
whatever answer he gave be utilized in the review of his qualifica-
tions. Allowing the airman later to assert that a different answer
would have been given had he read the questions (and, in the
process, to disavow a signed assurance to the effect they had been
perused) would promote a kind of “heads-I-win, tails-you-lose”
fraud in filling out applications that we are reluctant to excuse or
reward by accepting the kind of defense on which the respon-
dent in this proceeding rests.201
The Board, in reversing the credibility findings of Judge
Fowler that the airman did not have the intent to give a false
statement, further declared:
The Administrator’s position, in effect, is that respondent’s con-
victions were so recent, occurring only about five months before
the medical application was filled out, and so momentous that it
strains credulity to accept the respondent’s assertion that his fail-
ure to report them on the application was an innocent mistake,
rather than a purposeful effort to keep the information from the
Administrator. While we are in agreement with the Administrator
on [t]his point, we do not find it necessary to find that respon-
dent must have had the convictions on his mind when he filled
out the medical certificate application or that the existence of
these relatively fresh convictions for such major criminal infrac-
tions precludes a finding that the respondent could not have mis-
read a question that sought their discovery. Rather, it is sufficient
to note that the recency of the convictions and their serious char-
acter reduce still further the likelihood that respondent’s expla-
nation for not supplying the correct answer is truthful.202
201 Id.
202 Id. at *2.
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The Board granted the Administrator’s appeal, overturned
the credibility assessments of Judge Fowler, overturned the
Ninth Circuit ruling in Hart v. McLucas, and overturned the
Board’s decision in Administrator v. Juliao. The Board’s ruling in
Boardman is particularly troubling because it retreated from the
clear requirement articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Hart v.
McLucas that an entry made due to inattention will not satisfy
the requirement of knowledge for a false statement charge. In
fact, the defense of “inattention” was specifically recognized by
the Board in Juliao when the Board declared: “It is not enough,
under the regulation, to show what a respondent should have
known. Rather, the proof, either directly or circumstantially,
must show what he knew.”203
The Administrator in Boardman did exactly what it said it
could not do in Juliao. The Board in Juliao said that it could not
base a false statement charge on what the airman should have
known.204 But then in Boardman, the Board said, “respondent’s
convictions were so recent, occurring only about five months
before the medical application was filled out, and so momen-
tous that it strains credulity to accept respondent’s assertion that
his failure to report them on the application was an innocent
mistake[.]”205 It is impossible to reconcile the Board pronounce-
ment in Juliao with this pronouncement in Boardman. In Juliao,
the Board said it is not sufficient to show what the airman
should have known, but what he actually knew.206 In Boardman,
the Board said the respondent’s convictions were so recent and
momentous it “strains credulity to accepts respondent’s asser-
tion[.]”207 What the Board did in Boardman is overrule Juliao sub
silentio. The Board retreated from the requirement that the stan-
dard is not what the airman should have known but what the
airman actually knew as in Juliao and substituted the Board’s
own surmise about what the Board thinks the airman should
have known the question meant if he had carefully read the
form.
The Board’s decision in Boardman is a perfect illustration of
the arbitrary and capricious nature of Board decisions. What was
in style in 1976, 1977, and 1990 was not in style in 1996. In other
words, while the Board recognized that actual subjective under-
203 Juliao, 7 N.T.S.B. at 96 (citation omitted).
204 Id.
205 Boardman, 1996 WL 748190, at *2.
206 Juliao, 7 N.T.S.B. at 96.
207 Boardman, 1996 WL 748190, at *2.
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standing of the airman was essential after the Ninth Circuit rul-
ing in Hart, and after the court had actually effected that
requirement in its decision in Juliao, the Board ignored prece-
dent without specifically saying it was changing the law and con-
cluded the airman must have known what the Administrator was
asking on the form because “the convictions were so re-
cent[.]”208 The recency of the convictions is one thing, the air-
man’s subjective intent is another.
Judge Fowler, in compliance with the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Hart and in compliance with the Board’s decision in Juliao,
clearly understood the question before him was whether the re-
spondent’s inattention explained why the airman did not have
the requisite “knowledge” to suffer a revocation of his airman
certificates for a false statement charge. In contrast to the
Board, most judges have a strong understanding and apprecia-
tion for American jurisprudence, the concept of stare decisis,
and the meaning of ratio decidendi, that is, the reason or ratio-
nale for the decision. The Board does not have this understand-
ing. Not only is the Board generally uninformed about legal
principles but also the Board is concerned with “safety in air
commerce or air transportation and the public interest[,]”209
and because one of the functions of the Board is to issue safety
recommendations, the Board is, in part, a governmental “policy”
agency. The result is that Board decisions are frequently driven
more by policy concerns than legal principles. Airmen are hav-
ing their fates determined by a public policy agency and not by a
court. The Board changes its position on a given issue without
understanding it is doing so or without giving a reason for doing
so.
Lawyers who practice before the Board have an extraordinary
challenge because the decisions of the Board are not governed
by traditional notions of stare decisis nor binding precedent.
While that should be the case, as a matter of fact, and as illus-
trated by the Board’s decisions in Boardman, Sue, Vernick, Mur-
phy, and Moshea, the Board apparently lacks an understanding of
American jurisprudence, does not understand it is governed by
its own binding precedent, and routinely and without explana-
tion departs from binding precedent. This behavior by the
Board makes it virtually impossible for a legal practitioner to
give informed advice to his client about what the outcome may
208 Id.
209 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(1)(A) (2012).
2018] JURISDICTION OVER AIRMEN 293
be in any given fact pattern. Moreover, the declaration by the
Board in Boardman that it will not reward an airman who is inat-
tentive in completing his Medical Application Form is a repudia-
tion of the Board’s pronouncement in Administrator v. Hart: “We
are impressed, moreover, with the argument of respondent that
it is impossible to be inattentive and at the same time have ac-
tual knowledge of an act performed.”210 So, while the Board in
Hart understood that inattention could negate knowledge for
purposes of a false statement charge, the Board retreated from
that position without acknowledging it was doing so in Boardman
when the Board considered inattention to be “a willful disregard
of the truth[.]”211
In Administrator v. Martinez,212 the Board found the perfect op-
portunity to abandon the dictates of the Ninth Circuit in Hart v.
McLucas,213 and to complete its retreat from its decision in Ad-
ministrator v. Juliao.214 Martinez was the perfect opportunity to
take language that had been developed by the Board in Board-
man and Sue, and use that in a case where the Board knew it
would not be seriously challenged because Martinez was pro
se.215 Martinez had been convicted of disorderly conduct, a class
one misdemeanor, but gave a negative response to Question
18w on the Medical Application Form concerning “history of
nontraffic conviction(s) (misdemeanors or felonies).”216 Be-
cause Martinez was pro se and could not mount a serious legal
challenge, the FAA brought a motion for summary judgment to
have the ALJ make a determination solely on the pleadings, and
without an evidentiary hearing, that Martinez harbored the req-
uisite knowledge for the Administrator to make out a prima fa-
cie case of a materially false statement.217 The Board affirmed
Judge Geraghty’s order revoking the airman and medical certifi-
cates of Martinez, declaring:
In the case at issue, the evidence establishes the respondent pled
guilty to a misdemeanor in Maricopa County Justice Courts on
April 27, 2007. The evidence also establishes that, less than 8
months later, respondent completed an application for an air-
210 Hart, 3 N.T.S.B. 24, 26 (1977).
211 Boardman, 1996 WL 748190, at *1.
212 N.T.S.B. No. EA-5409, 2008 WL 4603570 (Oct. 7, 2008).
213 535 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1976).
214 7 N.T.S.B. 94 (1990).
215 Martinez, 2008 WL 4603570, at *1.
216 Id.
217 Id.
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man medical certificate, on which he indicated that he did not
have a history of “non-traffic conviction(s).” Respondent’s at-
tempt to justify his answer to question 18w on his application by
stating that he misinterpreted the question is unavailing, as we
have previously held that the failure to read questions on the
medical application closely enough to supply accurate answer is
not a basis to dispute a charge of intentional falsification. In Ad-
ministrator v. Boardman, for example, we stated that the respon-
dent’s failure to consider question 18w on a medical application
carefully before providing an answer did not establish a lack of
intent to provide false information, and that we were not per-
suaded by the respondent’s contention that the fact that he had
informed his employer of the impending conviction indicated
his lack of an intent to keep anyone of learning of the conviction.
Similarly, we recognized in Administrator v. Sue, that the argu-
ment that question 18w on the medical application is vague is
unavailing, and that, “the two questions about traffic and other
convictions are not confusing to a person of ordinary intelli-
gence.” Overall, we conclude that the law judge did not err in
rejecting respondent’s argument that he did not answer “yes” to
question 18w because he misunderstood the question. In addi-
tion, the law judge did not err in concluding that the evidence
established that respondent intentionally falsified his
application.218
The Board’s retreat from the requirements of the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Hart v. McLucas,219 and from the Board’s own ruling in
Administrator v. Juliao220 reached its full maturity and develop-
ment in Martinez, in which the Board rejected, sub silentio, the
legal principle that inattention could form the basis for a de-
fense to a false statement charge. Unhappily for the Board, its
full-blown retreat from binding precedent was just about to
come to an end.
In Administrator v. Dillmon,221 the author and Weldon Patter-
son, Esq., represented an airman who was the subject of an
emergency order of revocation.222 The airman had failed to dis-
close that he had been convicted of ten counts of bribery in re-
sponse to Question 18w on the Medical Application Form.223
Dillmon testified that he discussed the matter on several occa-
218 Id. at 3 (citation omitted).
219 535 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1976).
220 7 N.T.S.B. 94, 96 (1990).
221 N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-18349, 2008 WL 4685542 (Oct. 2, 2008).
222 Id. at *1.
223 Id. at *2.
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sions with his Aviation Medical Examiner, and based upon those
discussions, Dillmon understood that the FAA was concerned
about drug and alcohol convictions.224 Dillmon testified that “it
never entered his mind that flying an airplane in a safe and pru-
dent and reasonable manner had anything to do other than
with convictions or offenses related to one’s health.”225 Judge
Fowler, in reversing the emergency order of revocation,
declared:
That the Administrator established at a very minimum a prima
facie case. However, upon additional reflection and analyzation,
Respondent’s testimony coupled with the Respondent’s docu-
mentary exhibits, upwards of 17 exhibits, admitted into the hear-
ing record here, it is clear to me that there’s no intention on the
part of the Respondent to falsify, let alone be fraudulent in set-
ting forth the answers that he did to this question, 18W.
The Respondent’s case and the testimony itself, I think, stresses
that his medical application, particularly those questions 18V and
18W, definitely be deemed as somewhat excessively vague and
fundamentally ambiguous, and could easily raise the specter that
we have in this proceeding on what would appear to be inten-
tional false statements on the part of the applicant.
It is my judgment that the term “intentionally false” is the over-
riding, paramount governing factor in this proceeding. My deter-
mination and conclusion is that the Respondent successfully
rebutted with the documentary exhibits the Respondent pro-
duced, as well as the Respondent’s testimony itself, the prima fa-
cie case earlier established by the Administrator.226
In Administrator v. Dillmon,227 the Administrator appealed
from the Order of Judge Fowler, and the Board reversed Judge
Fowler’s initial decision, declaring:
We find that the law judge erred in concluding that respondent’s
failure to include his conviction on his medical applications due
to his confusion concerning question 18w did not constitute in-
tentional falsification. Respondent asserted that he had not read
the instructions that accompany the application, and that he pre-
sumed that the FAA would not be concerned with convictions
that did not relate to drugs or alcohol. We rejected this argu-
ment in Administrator v. Boardman, in which we stated that the
respondent’s failure to consider question 18w on a medical appli-
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. at *3.
227 N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5413, 2008 WL 4771937 (Oct. 7, 2008).
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cation carefully before providing an answer did not establish a
lack of intent to provide false information. Similarly, we recog-
nized in Administrator v. Sue, that the argument that question 18w
on the medical Application is vague was unavailing, and that “the
two questions about traffic and other convictions are not confus-
ing to a person of ordinary intelligence.”228
Undeterred, Mr. Dillmon appealed the Board’s order revers-
ing Judge Fowler and reinstating the order of revocation, filing
his petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Dillmon v. NTSB.229 In a stunning
rebuke of the Board and its retreat from binding precedent, the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia declared:
Petitioner Jack Rondal Dillmon accuses the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board (Board) of hypocrisy—saying one thing while
doing another. Dillmon argues the Board departed from its prior
decisions without adequate explanation when it affirmed the
Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) emergency revocation
of his airman and medical certificates. We agree with Dillmon:
the Board has failed to exhibit reasoned decision making we re-
quire of agencies. We therefore grant his petition for review.230
The D.C. Circuit summarized Dillmon’s testimony as it ap-
peared in the record and in the summary of Judge Fowler.231
The D.C. Circuit noted that the Board believed Judge Fowler
had erred in determining that “Dillmon had successfully rebut-
ted the FAA’s prima facie case[.]”232 The court also noted that
the Board determined that Judge Fowler had “erred by requir-
ing the Administrator to prove Dillmon had the specific intent
to deceive the FAA, rather than the lesser burden of proving
intent to falsify.”233 The court noted that “the Board’s policy is
not to disturb a credibility finding unless there is a compelling
reason or the finding was clearly erroneous.”234 The court fur-
ther noted that the Board had approved an initial decision of a
228 Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
229 588 F.3d 1085 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
230 Id. at 1087.
231 Id. at 1088–89.
232 Id. at 1089.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 1090 (citing Chirino v. NTSB, 849 F.2d 1525, 1529–30 (D.C. Cir.
1988)).
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law judge who concluded an airman did not have the intent to
falsify in Administrator v. Roarty.235
As the court noted, the Board may not reverse the decision of
a law judge simply because the Board might reach a different
conclusion.236 The court noted, “we are unable to reconcile the
Board’s decision with its precedent concerning its review of an
ALJ’s credibility determination.”237 The court noted that the
Board was silent on the pivotal issue about why it found Judge
Fowler’s credibility findings to be unreliable.238 Since the Board
failed to give an explanation for overturning Judge Fowler’s
credibility findings, the Board decision was a departure from
precedent. The court noted that it could not “ascertain whether
the Board reviewed the finding under the appropriate standard
or simply ignored it.”239 The court reiterated that the Board
never gave an explanation for its departure from Board prece-
dent.240 Dillmon argued that “the Board departed from its pre-
cedent by allowing the FAA to prove his intent by satisfying the
lesser burden of showing negligence (he should have known his
answer was false) rather than knowledge (he knew his answer
was false).”241 The court rejected the Board’s reasoning that
merely because Dillmon knew he had been convicted of bribery,
he had given a false response to Question 18w, since “Reynolds
appears to require the FAA to prove the airman subjectively un-
derstood what the question meant. Having announced this in-
terpretation of the intent element in Reynolds, the Board was
obligated to apply it consistently.”242
Since the Board had ignored the requirement of what the air-
man subjectively understood in the context of the “knowledge
requirement” for a false statement, the court remarked: “The
Board reversed the ALJ on the ground he erroneously departed
from its precedent in two respects. However, we conclude it was
the Board, not the ALJ, that applied precedent incorrectly.”243
The court specifically found the Board’s reliance on Boardman
235 Dillmon v. NTSB, 588 F.3d 1085, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Roarty,
N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5261, 2006 WL 3472333 (Nov. 21, 2006)).
236 Id.
237 Id. at 1091.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 1092.
241 Id. at 1093.
242 Id. at 1094 (citation omitted).
243 Id.
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and Sue was misplaced.244 Consequently, the Board’s decision in
Dillmon was vacated, and the matter remanded for further
proceedings.245
The Board was told by the Ninth Circuit in Hart v. McLucas,246
and again in Dillmon v. NTSB,247 that the airman’s subjective
state of mind had to be considered when adjudicating a false
statement charge, but the Board, like a petulant child, while
grudgingly accepting the reprimand, announced its intention to
cling to case law in the form of Boardman and Sue that was specif-
ically rejected by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Dillmon.
This reality is evident in Administrator v. Dillmon.248 In Administra-
tor v. Dillmon, the Board issued its opinion and order following
remand from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. In rendering its decision, the Board made
these observations:
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion makes it clear that the Board is re-
quired to consider a respondent’s subjective understanding of
the question at issue when the respondent alleges that he or she
misunderstood the question. In this regard, the court deter-
mined that our reliance in our original opinion on two of our
previous cases concerning the understanding of a question, Ad-
ministrator v. Boardman, NTSB Order No. EA-4515 (1996), and
Administrator v. Sue, NTSB Order No. EA-3877 (1993) was mis-
placed. The Court stated as follows:
Boardman stands for the proposition that the airman must read
the question carefully before answering . . . Sue stands for the
proposition that the question on the medical application are
not inherently too vague to support a finding of intentional
falsification.
588 F.3d at 1094–1095. Although the court did not overturn or
invalidate Boardman and Sue, it concluded that we did not cor-
rectly apply the standards of Boardman and Sue in this case. On
remand, we do not believe the Court’s above-quoted statements
concerning these cases preclude us in the future from consider-
ing whether an airman’s defense on this subject is credible, based
on the plain language of a question on the application. For ex-
ample, where an applicant admits that he or she did not read a
question carefully, a law judge is still free to reject the applicant’s
testimony that he or she did not understand the question. Like-
244 Id.
245 Id. at 1095.
246 535 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1976).
247 Dillmon, 588 F.3d at 1094.
248 Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5528, 2010 WL 2715714 (June 30, 2010).
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wise, when an applicant argues that he or she did not understand
a question that has a plain, unambiguous meaning, our law
judges may still consider such a defense as lacking credibility—
especially if the applicant did not seek clarification from a medi-
cal examiner or FAA employee—and determine that the evi-
dence suffices to prove that the airman intentionally falsified his
or her response to the question. Therefore, Boardman and Sue
continue to have relevance as they relate to a law judge’s ability
to assess and weigh testimony regarding a respondent’s under-
standing of a question, the meaning of which we have consist-
ently found obvious to a person of ordinary intelligence; they do
not stand for the proposition that a respondent may not raise his
or her subjective understanding of a question, or that a law judge
may resolve the question, without a factual finding as to whether
a respondent’s claim of confusion or misunderstanding is
credible.249
The meaning of the Board’s remarks in the language set out
above is extraordinarily disturbing. The D.C. Circuit had just de-
termined that the Board had failed to give a reason for rejecting
the credibility findings of Judge Fowler where the record
showed that Dillmon did not carefully read the instructions that
accompanied the Medical Application Form. But the Board,
once again clinging to Boardman and Sue, was giving instruction
to its law judges that they could still rely on Boardman and Sue
even though the D.C. Circuit found that the Board’s reliance on
Boardman and Sue was misplaced.250 The comments of the Board
in the wake of the reversal by the D.C. Circuit in Dillmon hear-
kens back to the behavior of the Board exhibited in Roarty
where the Board declared in its opinion that it was “unfortu-
nate” that the Administrator had not aggressively cross-ex-
amined the airman.251 There is a common theme that
permeates Board decisions. That common theme is that the
Board takes the FAA’s side. The Board and the FAA are in
league in their pursuit and coordination of enforcing and effect-
ing air safety in the United States. Because this kind of language
permeates Board decisions, it reinforces the first argument in
this article: the Board is biased and incapable of impartially ad-
judicating cases brought by the FAA to revoke or suspend an
airman’s certificate.252 The language of the Board in Administra-
249 Id. at *4–5.
250 Dillmon, 588 F.3d at 1094.
251 Roarty, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5261, 2006 WL 3472333, at *2 (Nov. 21,
2006).
252 See 5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3) (2018); 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(1)(A) (2018).
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tor v. Dillmon where it announced that it would continue to fol-
low its decisions in Boardman and Sue is not the kind of language
one would find in a lower court that had been rebuked by an
appellate court. However, the Board is not a court. It does not
pretend to be a court. In addition to its investigatory functions,
it views itself as a policy organization to ensure air safety and
ensures that its judges toe the line even in the face of a rebuke
by the D.C. Circuit.
The Board in Administrator v. Dillmon253 reversed course from
its earlier decisions, declaring: “In this case, the Administrator
did not provide sufficient evidence to overcome respondent’s
defense that he misunderstood question 18w.”254 Respectfully,
the Board’s language in Administrator v. Dillmon, after reversal
and remand by the D.C. Circuit, is extraordinarily confusing.
On the one hand, the Board appears to be doubling down on its
belief that Boardman and Sue are still relevant to Board proceed-
ings even after the D.C. Circuit found those cases were inappli-
cable. And while Boardman and Sue stand for the proposition
that an airman should read the instructions on the medical
form and that the medical form questions are not confusing, the
Board nonetheless, as directed by the D.C. Circuit, found that
“the Administrator did not provide sufficient evidence to over-
come the respondent’s defense that he misunderstood question
18w.”255 What the Board appears to be saying is that it is going to
have to find for the airman in this particular case, but in future
cases, the judge should consider Boardman and Sue, thereby de-
creasing the likelihood of airmen like Dillmon prevailing in sim-
ilar circumstances.
The Board’s choice of language in Administrator v. Dillmon fol-
lowing remand from the D.C. Circuit is further incongruous and
illogical for the following reasons:
(1) In Administrator v. Sue,256 the Board declared: “We there de-
termined that Manapat is not controlling and does not re-
quire a finding that the medical application was vague. We
also specifically found that, despite their placement under
the heading ‘Medical History,’ the two questions about traf-
fic and other convictions are not confusing to a person of
ordinary intelligence.”257
253 Dillmon, 2010 WL 2715714, at *1.
254 Id. at *6.
255 Id.
256 N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3877, 1993 WL 157467 (Apr. 28, 1993).
257 Id. at *2.
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(2) The Eleventh Circuit in Manapat declared: “We merely hold
that the government may not provide someone with a con-
fusing and ambiguous form and then prosecute when the
answers are inaccurate. The government could avoid this
problem by providing a separate form for convictions, or by
redesigning the Airman Medical Certificate application form
so that it clearly shows that critical non-medical information
is being requested of the applicant.”258
(3) However, even though the Board in Sue had rejected the
Eleventh Circuit ruling in Manapat, the Board made the fol-
lowing extraordinary comments in Dillmon:
As a separate matter, we do not believe the Administrator is now,
under this ruling, unable to pursue a matter in the face of testi-
mony from a respondent who claims subjective confusion about
a question on the medical application. As a prospective consider-
ation, the Administrator may strengthen his cases on alleged
§ 67.403(a)(1) violations by amending the application process
and forms to provide impeccable clarity. The application for a
medical certification asks whether an applicant has been con-
victed or subjected to any “administrative action(s).” We recog-
nize that the instructions that accompany the application, as
quoted above, provide examples of nontraffic convictions that an
applicant must report. However, the question on the form itself
may be revised to solicit more clearly the information that the
Administrator seeks. In addition, the application is one for a med-
ical certificate. It may behoove the Administrator to segregate
medical- and health-related questions from other questions, per-
haps on a separate form. Overall, given the D.C. Circuit’s opin-
ion in this case, the Administrator may wish to take this
opportunity to review the medical certificate application form
carefully, and amend it to avoid an applicant misconstruing a
question as respondent claimed to have done in the matter
before us. Unless, and until, the Administrator does so, certain
cases may very well require a detailed factual determination by
the law judge in ascertaining whether a respondent intended to
answer a question falsely.259
The Board’s posture on the FAA’s Medical Application Form
has been disingenuous and hypocritical. This is because the
Board declared in Sue “that, despite their placement under the
heading ‘Medical History,’ the two questions about traffic or
other convictions are not confusing to a person of ordinary in-
258 United States v. Manapat, 928 F.2d 1097, 1102 (11th Cir. 1991).
259 Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5528, 2010 WL 2715714, at *6 (June 30,
2010).
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telligence.”260 As far as the Board was concerned, the FAA Medi-
cal Application Form was unambiguous and not confusing to a
person of ordinary intelligence until the Board suffered a re-
buke and reversal in Dillmon. Then, the Board continued to
cling to its precedent in Boardman and Sue.261 But, in the same
breath, it contradicted itself by admitting what everyone who
had read Manapat knew, that “[i]t may behoove the Administra-
tor to segregate medical- and health-related questions from
other questions, perhaps on a separate form.”262
Not only does the opinion of the Board in Administrator v.
Dillmon following reversal and remand by the D.C. Circuit con-
tain a series of contradictions and incongruous statements, but
once again, the built-in bias of the Board in favor of the Admin-
istrator is on display for all the world to see. To wit: “As a pro-
spective consideration, the Administrator may strengthen his
cases on alleged § 67.403(a)(1) violations by amending the ap-
plication process and forms to provide impeccable clarity.”263
This language in the Board’s opinion in Administrator v. Dillmon
following remand from the D.C. Circuit once again displays the
institutional bias the Board exhibits against airmen and in favor
of the FAA.264
In Administrator v. Singleton,265 where the airman was repre-
sented by Kathleen Yodice, Esq., Judge Pope granted summary
judgment to the FAA when the airman suffered a driver’s license
suspension for a cause related to alcohol and had neglected to
disclose this on his Medical Application Form.266 The airman
asserted that he believed he only had to give an affirmative re-
sponse if the revocation was due to a conviction.267 Judge Pope
granted summary judgment to the FAA, and the Board affirmed,
continuing its reliance on Boardman (the airman must carefully
read the questions on the medical application before providing
an answer)268 and Sue (“the two questions about traffic and
other convictions are not confusing to a person of ordinary in-
260 Sue, 1993 WL 157467, at *2.
261 Dillmon, 2010 WL 2715714, at *5.
262 Id. at *6.
263 Id.
264 See Roarty, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5261, 2006 WL 3472333, at *1–2 (Nov.
21, 2006).
265 N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5437, 2009 WL 870356, at *1 (Mar. 24, 2009).
266 Id.
267 Id. at *9.
268 See id. at *3 (citing Boardman, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4515, 2009 WL
870356, at *3 (Mar. 24, 2009)).
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telligence”).269 In denying the airman’s appeal, the Board de-
clared, “[f]urthermore in McGonegal . . . we held that the
Administrator need not establish intent to falsify, but only that
the respondent made false answers while cognizant of their fal-
sity.”270 The Board pronouncement rejecting the airman’s ap-
peal in Singleton was clearly wrong since the Board once again
chose to ignore the requirement of subjective intent as an ele-
ment of “knowledge” in a false statement case.271 Recognizing
the grave error committed by the Board in affirming Judge
Pope, Singleton naturally appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Singleton v. Babbitt.272
The D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded the Board’s affirmation
of Judge Pope’s grant of summary judgment and rejected the
Board’s position “that Singleton’s understanding of Question
18v was not even relevant to whether he had knowledge requi-
site to make an intentionally false statement.”273 The D.C. Cir-
cuit reminded the Board that the elements of intentional falsity
were “(1) a false representation (2) in reference to a material
fact (3) made with knowledge of its falsity.”274 The D.C. Circuit
explained to the Board that “knowledge of falsity” was required
and necessitated “reference to the mental state of the person
who makes the entry.”275 The D.C. Circuit, referencing Dillmon
v. NTSB, explained that the requisite proof had to include that
the “airman subjectively understood what the question
meant.”276 The D.C. Circuit also noted, “in the past, the FAA
and NTSB have suggested that credibility hearings are the norm
in intentional falsification cases because factual determinations
about knowledge do not readily lend themselves to adjudication
on paper.”277 The D.C. Circuit, noting that Singleton’s reading
of the medical form was “not inherently implausible,” found
269 Id. (citing Sue, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3877, 1993 WL 157467, at *2 (Apr.
28, 1993)).
270 Id. at *4.
271 See, e.g., Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1976) (where the
Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the FAA could prevail in a false state-
ment case “even if the person who made the statement did not know the state-
ment to be false”); Dillmon v. NTSB, 588 F.3d 1085, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(“Reynolds appears to require the FAA to prove the airman subjectively under-
stood what the question meant.”).
272 588 F.3d 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
273 Id. at 1081.
274 Id. at 1082 (quoting Hart v. McLucas, 535 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1976)).
275 Id.
276 Id. (quoting Dillmon v. NTSB, 588 F.3d 1085, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
277 Id. at 1083.
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that the Board acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, va-
cated the Board’s summary judgment order, and remanded the
case for further proceedings.278
In Administrator v. Singleton,279 the Board recognized that the
decision in Singleton was issued in tandem with the opinion in
Dillmon v. NTSB and recognized that the outcome of the case
“may rest upon the respondent’s alleged subjective understand-
ing of the question.”280 The case was remanded to Judge Pope to
make a credibility finding concerning Singleton’s subjective
state of mind.281
In Administrator v. Manin,282 Judge Fowler granted summary
judgment to the Administrator where the airman failed to dis-
close on his medical application forms two convictions for do-
mestic violence and disorderly conduct.283 The Board, in
affirming the initial decision of Judge Fowler, advanced three
spurious arguments: (1) that the airman must read the applica-
tion form carefully and that the Board rejects the airman’s own
interpretation of the requirements of a medical certificate; (2)
that Question 18w on the Medical Application Form could be
understood by a person of ordinary intelligence;284 and (3) that
“[a] respondent’s incorrect answers on his medical applications
amount to an intentional falsification under Board precedent
when the respondent was cognizant of their falsity.”285
278 Babbitt, 588 F.3d at 1084–85.
279 N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5529, 2010 WL 2846975, at *3 (June 30, 2010).
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5439, 2008 WL 5972912 (Apr. 13, 2008).
283 Id. at *1.
284 While the Board maintained in Manin that the form could be understood
by a person of ordinary intelligence, the Board appeared to contradict this state-
ment in Administrator v. Dillmon:
In addition, the application is one for a medical certificate. It may
behoove the Administrator to segregate medical- and health-related
questions from other questions, perhaps on a separate form. Over-
all, given the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in this case, the Administrator
may wish to take this opportunity to review the medical certificate
application form carefully, and amend it to avoid an applicant mis-
construing a question as respondent claimed to have done in the
matter before us. Unless, and until, the Administrator does so, cer-
tain cases may very well require a detailed factual determination by
the law judge in ascertaining whether a respondent intended a
question falsely.
Dillmon, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5528, 2010 WL 2715714, at *6 (June 30, 2010).
285 Manin, 2008 WL 5972912, at *4.
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Manin, just like Dillmon and Singleton before him, was com-
pelled to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, where he was represented by Kathleen
Yodice, Esq., in Manin v. NTSB.286 Just as the D.C. Circuit ex-
plained to the Board in Singleton,287 the D.C. Circuit once again
explained to the Board that “a pilot’s understanding of a ques-
tion is not irrelevant[.]”288 There were other errors in the
Board’s analysis in Manin that will be discussed in the next topic
of this article, dealing with arbitrary and capricious decisions of
the Board. Suffice it to say that once again, the D.C. Circuit va-
cated and remanded the Board’s decision granting summary
judgment to the FAA because “[a]s our decisions in Dillmon and
Singleton make clear, Board precedent requires consideration of
a pilot’s subjective understanding of questions on a medical cer-
tificate application. The Board’s unexplained failure to adhere
to this precedent renders it action arbitrary and capricious.”289
In Administrator v. Manin,290 the Board, upon remand of the
Manin case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, declared:
The Court further instructed us to reconsider respondent’s argu-
ments concerning intentional falsification, given the Court re-
cently remanded Dillmon . . . with direction that we must consider
a respondent’s subjective understanding of a question on a medi-
cal certificate application when a respondent presents such an
argument. In light of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Dillmon, we
issued a post-remand opinion and order instructing law judges to
assess a respondent’s credibility in determining whether the re-
spondent misunderstood a question on a medical certificate ap-
plication. In addition, we issued an opinion in Administrator v.
Singleton, applying this new standard and consequently stating
summary judgment is an improper means for disposing of inten-
tional falsification cases. It is this standard we direct the law judge
to apply on remand in the case at issue here.
Similar to the circumstances of Singleton, we are compelled to re-
mand this case to the law judge for a determination concerning
respondent’s state of mind at the time he completed the medical
certificate applications in question. As we indicated in our post-
remand Dillmon opinion, law judges’ credibility findings concern-
ing a respondent’s defense that he or she misunderstood a ques-
286 627 F.3d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
287 588 F.3d 1078, 1079–80 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
288 Manin, 627 F.3d at 1244.
289 Id. (citation omitted).
290 N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5586, 2011 WL 2141430, at *1 (May 19, 2011).
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tion on the application are critical in determining the veracity
and overall practicability of the defense. Therefore, we ask the
law judge to consider all evidence—both direct and circumstan-
tial—indicating respondent’s state of mind at the time he com-
pleted the applications.291
The language that the Board employed above demonstrates
that the Board does not understand the three elements of a false
statement case laid down in 1976 by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Hart v. McLucas.292 It has been
no secret to the Board since 1976 that in order for the Adminis-
trator to prevail, evidence had to be adduced with respect to the
subjective intent of the airman either in making a logbook entry
or in filling out a Medical Application Form. As has been illus-
trated in this article, the Board has been working diligently on
behalf of the FAA to establish a standard of strict liability so that
these cases can be adjudicated on summary judgment, thereby
saving the taxpayers the cost of a trial, but at the same time,
denying airmen due process of law.293 While the Board in Manin
portrayed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia as “applying this new standard”294 there
was nothing “new” about the standard at all. This has been the
standard since 1976. However, the Board has been in headlong
retreat from the standard and attempted, for the convenience of
the FAA and the Board, to impose a strict liability standard that
can be adjudicated on summary judgment without the mess and
fuss of a trial, and without ensuring that airmen’s rights to due
process are properly protected, a consideration of small conse-
quence to the Board.295
291 Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
292 535 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1976).
293 Martinez, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5409, 2008 WL 4603570, at *2–3 (Oct. 7,
2008).
294 Manin, 2011 WL 2141430, at *3 (where the Administrator was allowed to
prevail on a motion for summary judgment where the airman undertook to re-
present himself without the assistance of counsel) (emphasis added).
295 Boardman, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4515, 1996 WL 748190, at *1 (Dec. 20,
1996).
We think that such an airman, having acted in a manner that could
be viewed as evincing a willful disregard of the truth or falsity of the
information officially submitted and, therefore, in a way reflecting
contempt for the airman medical certification process, should be de-
termined to have intended that whatever answer he gave be utilized in
the review of his qualifications.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Sue, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-3877, 1993 WL 157467,
at *2 (May 12, 1993).
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The experiences of Dillmon, Singleton, and Manin painfully
illustrate the waste of time and resources that is being expended
on this dysfunctional system of adjudicating airman certificate
actions. The Board does not understand the body of law it pur-
ports to apply. The Board retreats from well-established law de-
cided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Board ignores
well-established law pronounced by the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals. Then, when the D.C. Circuit in Dillmon, Singleton,
and Manin required the Board to make a finding that the air-
man harbored subjective intent, the Board claims that this is a
“new” standard. This system of adjudicating airman cases is bro-
ken and cannot be repaired. Airmen, with an expectation of an
impartial adjudicator and due process of law, have a right to
have their cases adjudicated in federal district court.
D. BECAUSE THE BOARD DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE
PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS AND CONFUSES ITS OBLIGATION TO
PROTECT AIR SAFETY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST WITH DUE
PROCESS, IT REPEATEDLY IGNORES STANDING PRECEDENT AND
ISSUES DECISIONS THAT ARE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS,
NECESSITATING COSTLY APPEALS TO THE APPELLATE COURTS IN
ORDER TO FORCE THE BOARD TO FOLLOW ITS OWN RULES
The author had two cases litigated before the Board at the
same time with identical facts where the trial court rulings were
diametrically opposed. These cases were litigated before the
Board and before the courts of appeal for nearly five years. It
took five years to get a just outcome and proper decision in two
very simple cases involving the “stale complaint rule,” Rule 33 of
the Board’s Rules of Practice.296 After nearly five years of litiga-
tion, resulting ultimately in a favorable outcome to the airmen,
the Board still did not recognize its error but rather merely
mimicked the language dictated to the Board by the court of
appeals. For anyone who would argue that litigation before the
Board is economical and efficient, a study of these two cases will
convince any thinking person to the contrary.
We there determined that Manapat is not controlling and does not
require a finding that the medical application was vague. We also
specifically found that, despite their placement under the heading
“Medical History,” the two questions about traffic and other convic-
tions are not confusing to a person of ordinary intelligence.
Id.
296 49 C.F.R. § 821.33 (2018).
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On December 18, 1998, the appeal was filed in the case of
Administrator v. Shrader.297 After the filing of the appeal with the
Board, the author filed a motion to dismiss the Administrator’s
complaint as stale on behalf of Shrader.298 Shrader’s driver’s li-
cense was suspended by the State of California on April 11,
1995, for driving with an excessive blood alcohol level, culminat-
ing in a conviction on May 8, 1995, in Orange County, Califor-
nia.299 Shrader completed his medical application on April 24,
1997.300 In completing his medical application, Shrader was very
explicit. He gave an affirmative response to the question con-
cerning “History of Driving Offenses” and specifically wrote on
the form “1995, March 12, DUI, California[.]”301 The Adminis-
trator was on notice of the fact that Shrader had suffered a DUI
conviction in California on March 8, 1995 by virtue of his Medi-
cal Application Form of April 24, 1997.302
Nearly eleven months after Shrader completed his Medical
Application Form, the FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Certifi-
cate Action on March 13, 1998, claiming that Shrader had not
reported his conviction of driving under the influence within
sixty days as required by 14 C.F.R. § 61.15(e).303 As revealed by
the record in Shrader, when an airman completes his Medical
Application Form, the medical application data is placed on a
computer tape with the names of the applicants and then dis-
patched by the FAA to the National Driver Register (NDR).304
The NDR then examines the names and compiles an electronic
list on a computer tape, and that tape captures the states or ju-
risdictions in which airmen have suffered legal or administrative
297 N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5100, 2004 WL 1375856, at *2 (Mar. 25, 2003)
(“This case was originally filed back over four years ago, December 18th of
1998.”).
298 Shrader, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4971, 2002 WL 1041171, at *4 (May 14,
2002).
The respondent has moved for an Order Dismissing Stale Com-
plaint as provided in Rule 33 of the Board’s Rules, 49 C.F.R. Sec.
821.33. The Administrator has responded to this Motion alleging
that there was good cause for the delay and, further, the Adminis-
trator has moved for Judgment on the Pleadings.
Id.





304 Shrader, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4971, 2002 WL 1041171, at *1 (May 14,
2002).
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action against their drivers’ licenses.305 After the NDR returns
the tape with the information regarding who suffered adminis-
trative or legal action against their drivers’ licenses, then the
FAA security personnel compare that data to information ap-
pearing on the National Law Telecommunications System
(NLETS).306 Between June 2 and June 9, 1997, the FAA received
the data downloaded from the DUI tracking system of the DUI/
DWI Investigation Program but waited more than two months to
assign the tape to a special agent for review on August 20,
1997.307 After that two-month delay from the FAA’s receipt of
the NDR data, the special agent waited from August 20, 1997, to
February 6, 1998, to begin her investigation of the data on the
tape.308 Then on March 13, 1998, over nine months after the
FAA had received the tape from NDR, the agency issued a sus-
pension order against Shrader’s airman certificate.309
At all times relevant to this discussion, the Board had in place
Rule 33 of its Rules of Practice,310 which provided:
Where the complaint states allegations of offenses which oc-
curred more than 6 months prior to the Administrator’s advising
the respondent as to reasons for proposed action under 49
U.S.C. § 44709(c), the respondent may move to dismiss such alle-
gations as stale pursuant to the following provisions:
(a) In those cases where the complaint does not allege lack of
qualification of the respondent:
(1) The Administrator shall be required to show, by reply filed
within 15 days after the date of service of the respondent’s mo-
tion, that good cause existed for the delay in providing such
advice, or that the imposition of a sanction is warranted in the
public interest, notwithstanding the delay or the reasons
therefor.
(2) If the Administrator does not establish good cause for the
delay, or for the imposition of a sanction in the public interest
notwithstanding the delay, the law judge shall dismiss the stale
allegations and proceed to adjudicate the remaining portion
of the complaint, if any.311
305 Id. at *1–2 (May 14, 2002); Ramaprakash, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4947,
2002 WL 226617, at *1–3 (Feb. 11, 2002).
306 Shrader, 2002 WL 1041171, at *1–2.
307 Id.
308 Id. at *2.
309 Id. at *1–2.
310 49 C.F.R. § 821.33(a) (2018).
311 Id.
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Any person reading Rule 33 will recognize that there is a dis-
tinction between the “good cause” and the “public interest” ex-
ceptions. Unfortunately, this distinction was lost on the Board as
will be apparent from the remainder of this discussion. Because
eleven months had elapsed from the date Shrader disclosed his
DUI conviction on his Medical Application Form, and nine
months had elapsed from the date the agency was in possession
of the computer data delivered from NDR, the author, acting on
behalf of Shrader, moved to dismiss the complaint while the
FAA alleged there was good cause for the delay and moved for
judgment on the pleadings.312 On May 26, 1999, Judge Mullins
passed an order dismissing the Administrator’s complaint in
Shrader as stale.313 Judge Mullins reasoned that whether one took
the starting date as the date the FAA received the data on
Shrader’s Medical Application Form or the date the Administra-
tor received the data from the NDR, the charges brought against
Shrader were stale and should be dismissed.314 Judge Mullins
noted: “The Board has held if the Administrator need go no
further than her own records, then the stale complaint time be-
gins.”315 As relates to the Administrator’s receipt of the data
from the NDR, Judge Mullins further declared: “Even this date
was seven months prior to the issuance of the NOPCA.”316 Con-
sequently, the Administrator’s complaint was dismissed as stale
and the Administrator’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
was declared to be moot.317
At the very same time the author was representing Shrader,
the author was also representing Tilak Ramaprakash in Adminis-
trator v. Ramaprakash.318 While the author had filed the appeal
on behalf of Shrader on December 18, 1998,319 the appeal on
behalf of Ramaprakash was filed with the Board on February 3,
1999.320 On February 25, 1997, Ramaprakash was convicted of
driving under the influence in the Doraville Municipal Court in
312 Shrader, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4971, 2002 WL 1041171, at *4 (May 14,
2002).
313 Id. at *1.
314 Id. at *6 n.1.
315 Id. at *5 (citing Pacholke, 5 N.T.S.B. 467, 469 (1985)).
316 Id. at *6.
317 Id.
318 N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4947, 2002 WL 226617, at *1 (Feb. 7, 2002).
319 Shrader, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5100, 2004 WL 1375856, at *2 (Mar. 25,
2003).
320 Ramaprakash, 2002 WL 226617, at *5.
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Doraville, Georgia.321 The computer tape was received by FAA
personnel from the NDR on May 16, 1997.322 Three days later,
on May 19, 1997, the computer tape was assigned to Ms. Bussing
for processing, and she took action on the file. The tape was
then transferred to Special Agent Fields for work.323 Then, due
to a transfer of Special Agent Fields, the tape was reassigned to
Special Agent Sloan on September 16, 1997.324 Then, when Spe-
cial Agent Sloan transferred to a new position, the tape was reas-
signed to Special Agent Simpson on October 27, 1997.325
Finally, on February 4, 1998, Special Agent Simpson electroni-
cally interrogated NLETS and discovered a positive response for
Ramaprakash indicating an unreported alcohol-related convic-
tion or administrative action motor vehicle violation.326 Over
two months later, the FAA issued the Notice of Proposed Certifi-
cate Action on April 22, 1998.327 The NOPCA was issued by the
FAA eleven months after it came into possession of the data
from the NDR from which it could have ascertained a violation
of the regulations by Ramaprakash.328
On the very same day Judge Mullins granted the motion to
dismiss in Shrader, Judge Pope denied the motion to dismiss in
Ramaprakash.329 Judge Pope, in denying the airman’s motion to
dismiss the stale complaint, relied upon Administrator v. Ikeler.330
Judge Pope failed to recognize that the Board’s decision in Ikeler
was a departure from Board precedent without explanation.
The Board in Ikeler incorrectly found that the six months only
begin to run after the FAA had found a violation, ignoring estab-
lished precedent that the six months begins to run when the
FAA has in its possession information concerning “possible vio-
lations.”331 On February 11, 2002, the Board affirmed the order
of Judge Pope denying the motion to dismiss the stale complaint
321 Id. at *1.
322 Id. at *2.
323 Id.




328 Id. at *1–2.
329 Id. at *4 (Order Denying Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Adm’r’s Com-
plaint, (May 26, 1999) (the same date as the Order of Judge Mullins in Shrader)).
330 Id. at *6 (citing Ikeler, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4695, 1998 WL 564088 (Aug.
31, 1998)).
331 Dill, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4099, 1994 WL 78131, at *4 (Feb. 20, 2004).
The author represented Mr. Dill and two other airmen in that case. The Adminis-
trator, after issuing a revocation order against Dill’s certificates and suspension,
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in Ramaprakash, doing so “given the importance to air safety of
monitoring the alcohol-related infractions of certificated air-
men.”332 Member Goglia, joined by Member Hammerschmidt,
dissented as follows:
The stale complaint rule (49 C.F.R. 821.33) is simple, straightfor-
ward and clear. If more than 6 months elapse, then the Adminis-
trator shall be required to show good cause. Good cause is not
established (shown) in this case.
I specifically do not agree with the language in the opinion that
suggests that the stale complaint rule is diluted by a balancing of
the “Administrator interests in prioritizing her enforcement ef-
forts . . . (against) . . . the negative impact of forcing an airman to
answer a charge long after the conduct giving rise to it.” There
either ‘is’ a stale complaint rule or there ‘is not.’333
After the Board affirmed the decision of Judge Pope dis-
missing the stale complaint motion in Ramaprakash, the Board
reversed the order of Judge Mullins in Shrader on May 17,
2002.334 The Board, in reversing Judge Mullins, ignored the
clear language of its own rule, Rule 33, and donned the cloak as
the protector of public safety, citing its decision in
Ramaprakash335 as a supposed basis for its reversing the order of
Judge Mullins dismissing the complaint as stale.336 Rather than
following precedent, the Board went on a tangent, announcing
its decision was made “given the importance to air safety of mon-
ordered against the certificates of Eide and Prater. The Board in Dill affirmed the
order of Judge Davis issued December 17, 1991, declaring,
Once the Administrator identified the respondents as involved in
potential and ongoing violations dating back almost two years, he
was required to treat these stale charges as non-routine, priority
matters . . . and minimize any further delay . . . We think this is
particularly so where the FAA had been in contact with respon-
dents’ employer from the outset, and when there had been an out-
standing invitation from his employer to discuss the timeshare
arrangement if the FAA questioned its legal status.
Id.; see also Thomson, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4170, 1994 WL 228277 (May 12,
1994) (The author was successful in having a revocation against Thompson’s cer-
tificates dismissed in an order granting motion to dismiss stale complaint passed
by Judge Fowler on August 5, 1991. The Board affirmed the order of Judge
Fowler on May 27, 1994.).
332 Ramaprakash, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4947, 2002 WL 226617, at *1–3 (Feb,
7, 2002).
333 Id. at *4.
334 Shrader, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4971, 2002 WL 1041171, at *1 (May 14,
2002).
335 2002 WL 226617, at *1.
336 Shrader, 2002 WL 1041171, at *2.
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itoring alcohol-related infractions of certificated airmen[.]”337
The Board, in language that can best be described as muddled
ambiguity in reversing Judge Mullins’s order dismissing the
complaint, declared:
While we would have preferred a more detailed explanation of
the time period between the assignment of the tape to the spe-
cial investigator and her commencement of its review, the rea-
sons supplied are sufficient to satisfy the good cause burden in
this instance. As we recognized in Ramaprakash, there is a strong
safety-related rationale for taking into account the Administra-
tor’s need for some flexibility in the administration of this pro-
gram. Our opinion, however, is not to be read as an acceptance
of any delay, regardless of length, in all situations. It would seem
that the benefit to aviation safety of monitoring alcohol-related
driving infractions of certificated airmen may well be diluted if
too much time is consumed in the effort to discover them.338
As was the case in Ramaprakash, Member Goglia dissented,
joined by Member Hammerschmidt in Shrader, declaring:
I dissent on Notation 7336B, Administrator v. Shrader. It should
not be re-opened. The reasons supplied continue to be insuffi-
cient in satisfying the burden of the Administrator to show good
cause to avoid dismissal of the complaint. It is stale under the
regulation that requires the Administrator to take timely action.
There is no good reason for the Administrator to now take disci-
plinary action based on an April 1995 event. The Administrator
must take more timely action.339
The language employed by the majority in Shrader to reverse
the order of Judge Mullins dismissing the complaint is clear and
palpable evidence that the Board is incapable of performing an
adjudicative function. The Board views itself as a public policy
machine to ensure air safety. For that reason, it is inevitably all
too happy to oblige the Administrator when the FAA requires
“some flexibility” in the administration of the regulations.340
After the Board reversed Judge Mullins in Shrader, counsel in
Ramaprakash petitioned for reconsideration of the Board’s deci-
sion in Ramaprakash affirming the order of Judge Pope in deny-
ing the motion to dismiss. In Administrator v. Ramaprakash,341 the
majority declared:
337 Id. (quoting Ramaprakash, 2002 WL 226617, at *3).
338 Id. at *2.
339 Id. at *4.
340 Id. at *2.
341 N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4984, 2002 WL 1586404, at *1 (July 16, 2002).
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[W]e decline to extend the stale complaint rule under these cir-
cumstances, i.e., where the “delay” is non-prejudicial to respon-
dent’s ability to defend against the charges (having admitted all
factual allegations) and accrued, essentially, because the Admin-
istrator chose to delegate her resources in a manner that would
not immediately, but eventually, detect airmen’s non-compliance
with a mandatory reporting requirement that respondent admits
to not adhering to.342
This unfortunate language reaffirms the reality that the Board
does not understand stare decisis. There was no request that the
Board “extend” the stale complaint rule in Ramaprakash or
Shrader. All Ramaprakash was seeking was for the Board to en-
force the rule as written and to enforce precedent as the Board
had articulated in previous decisions. The Board ignored its re-
sponsibility to do so. In the order denying reconsideration in
Ramaprakash, Member Goglia, joined by Member Hammersch-
midt, authored a four-page dissent noting that the majority was
misinformed in its belief that an airman must demonstrate
prejudice in a stale complaint case, since prejudice is presumed
as a matter of law.343 Members Goglia and Hammerschmidt fur-
ther remarked that the Ikelar decision was of no precedential
value because there was no articulation of “good cause” for de-
lay in that decision.344
Moreover, and very significantly, the dissent noted: “Ikelar it-
self is inconsistent with Board precedent[.]”345 Member Goglia
joined by Hammerschmidt further declared, correctly, that “the
Ikelar case masses [sic] the mark because it erroneously suggests
that the six month period commences when the Administrator
‘learns’ of the violation, instead of from the ‘date’ of the viola-
tion, as stated in the stale complaint rule.”346 Members Goglia
and Hammerschmidt also noted that the majority had miscon-
strued the stale complaint rule in emphasizing the time at the
end of the investigation instead of the totality of the Administra-
tor’s actions.347 The majority in Ramaprakash declared in a foot-
note that it had “placed the Administrator on notice that in
future cases we will look more closely at the time that elapses
342 Id. at *2 (emphasis added).




347 See Ramaprakash, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4984, 2002 WL 1586404, at *3
(July 16, 2002).
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between the time the Administrator could have, but did not,
learn of the violation[.]”348 Members Goglia and Hammersch-
midt made short work of this double talk declaring: “It is the
wrong standard to apply, and it is unfair to airmen, to suggest
that the Board is ‘warning’ the FAA by stating in effect that ‘we
will let this one go, but don’t do it again.’”349
The author obtained a stay order from the Board in
Ramaprakash, referring the matter to Mark T. McDermott, Esq.,
for an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.350 Then, a motion for reconsideration was
sought in Shrader, which the Board denied on December 30,
2002.351 Shrader’s motion for reconsideration was denied be-
cause, “[t]wo members of the Board (Acting Chairman
Carmody and Member Black) would deny the petition, and two
Members of the Board (Members Hammerschmidt and Goglia)
would grant the petition.”352
On October 21, 2003, almost four years after the lodging of
the appeals with the Board in Ramaprakash and Shrader, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Ramaprakash v. FAA353 reversed the Board because the Board
had departed from agency precedent without explanation for
three separate and distinct reasons. In doing so, Judge (now
Chief Justice) Roberts wrote:
Learned Hand once remarked that agencies tend to “fall into
grooves . . . and when they get into grooves, then God save you to
get them out.” Judge Hand never met the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board. In this case, we grant the petition for review
because the Board has failed adequately to explain its departures
from its own precedent in no fewer than three significant
respects.354
The court first reversed the Board because the Board rea-
soned that the gravity of the violation mitigated against enforc-
ing against the stale complaint rule when Board precedent was
exactly the opposite. In other words, the more serious the viola-
tion, the more dispatch must be exhibited by the Administra-
348 Id. at *4 n.1.
349 Id. at *3.
350 Ramaprakash, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4989, 2002 WL 1878787 (Aug. 9,
2002); Ramaprakash v. FAA, 346 F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
351 Shrader, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5012, 2002 WL 31906687 (Dec. 30, 2002).
352 Id.
353 Ramaprakash, 346 F.3d at 1121.
354 Id. at 1122.
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tor.355 Because the Board’s case law recognized that the
seriousness of the violation required more dispatch, rather than
less dispatch, the court reversed the Board because its ruling in
Ramaprakash constituted a departure from precedent and was
therefore arbitrary and capricious.356 Second, the court re-
minded the Board that, under the stale complaint rule,
prejudice is presumed and there is no requirement that the air-
man demonstrate prejudice as a requirement for having the
complaint dismissed.357 The court further noted, “[a]pplying
the stale complaint rule to Ramaprakash’s case would not ‘ex-
tend’ the rule at all—unless the Board is no longer adopting a
presumption of prejudice.”358
Finally, the court noted that the six-month requirement of the
stale complaint rule begins to run not when the Administrator
has actual knowledge of a violation, but when the Administrator
is in receipt of information concerning possible violations.359
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
in rebuking the Board’s conduct in Ramaprakash, declared:
This court has observed that “the core concern underlying the
prohibition of arbitrary or capricious agency action” is that
agency “ad hocery” is impermissible. The statements extracted
above indicate that the Board has failed to satisfy this core re-
quirement. They amount to a promise from the Board that at
some point in the future, the stale complaint rule may again
mean what it once did—depending on “specific facts of future
cases.” It is impossible at this point to tell whether the Board, in
the next stale complaint case, will assess the seriousness of the
violation or will not; will insist on a showing of prejudice, or will
not; will require FAA diligence in investigating a possible viola-
tion as well as in prosecuting a known one, or not. We have it on
high authority that “the tendency of law must always be to narrow
the field of uncertainty.” The Board’s unexplained departures
from precedent do the opposite. “[W]here an agency departs
from established precedent without a reasoned explanation, its
decision will be vacated as arbitrary and capricious.” For the rea-
sons stated we vacate the orders and remand to the Board for
further proceedings.360
355 Id. at 1124–25.
356 Id.
357 Id. at 1126–27.
358 Id. at 1127.
359 Id. at 1127–28.
360 Id. at 1130 (citations omitted).
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On January 30, 2004, nearly five years after Ramaprakash filed
his appeal with the Board, the Board grudgingly dismissed the
complaint against Ramaprakash on remand, because “[t]he
Court held that we ‘departed from [our] . . . longstanding re-
quirement of prosecutorial diligence in stale complaint
case.’”361 Not only had nearly five years been consumed in litiga-
tion before the Board in Ramaprakash but also, since the same
was true in Shrader, the Board was compelled to rule in favor of
Shrader after the ruling of the circuit court in Ramaprakash.362
On June 18, 2004, the Board reversed its previous decisions, cit-
ing Ramaprakash v. Federal Aviation Administration, and declared:
Accordingly, consistent with Ramaprakash, we conclude that the
Administrator failed to meet the applicable due diligence stan-
dard in this case, for after receiving an NDR tape with informa-
tion about respondent on August 14, 1997, she did not issue to
respondent her Notice of Proposed Certificate Action
(“NOPCA”) until March 13, 1998 . . . Respondent’s stale com-
plaint motion should have been granted.363
It is noteworthy that prior to the Board reversing its previous
decisions in Shrader, the Board denied a petition for reconsider-
ation in Shrader where the Board was deadlocked, with two mem-
bers in favor of granting the petition for reconsideration and
two members opposing it.364
The nearly five-year ordeal of the airmen in Ramaprakash and
Shrader refutes any argument that litigation before the Board
saves resources because it is expeditious and efficient. Litigation
before the Board is neither expeditious nor efficient. The Board
does not consider itself bound by its own rules. The Board does
not understand Rule 33 of the Board’s Rules of Practice since it
clearly believes that public interest is a sub-species of good cause
when they are two entirely different concepts, as made clear
from a reading of the opinion in Ramaprakash v. FAA where the
court wrote:
The rule allows a stale complaint to escape dismissal if the FAA
can show good cause for the delay, but it also states that a stale
complaint can survive if the FAA can show that “the imposition of
361 Ramaprakash, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5076, 2004 WL 187527, at *2 (Jan.
28, 2004).
362 Shrader, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5100, 2004 WL 1375856, at *1 (June 17,
2004).
363 Id. at *1 (citation omitted).
364 Shrader, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5012, 2002 WL 31906687, at *1 (Dec. 30,
2002).
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a sanction is warranted in the public interest, notwithstanding
the delay or reasons therefor.” 49 C.F.R. § 821.33(a)(1). There
would appear to be little need for the public interest to be
weighed in any determination of whether good cause exists for
delay, when the rule provides an independent and adequate ave-
nue by which stale complaints found to implicate the public in-
terest can proceed.365
Not only did the Board confuse the “good cause” and “public
interest” exceptions to Rule 33 in Ramaprakash and Shrader but it
also made a similar error in Administrator v. Manin366 where the
Board made this profoundly incorrect statement of law: “We
have long held that the doctrine of laches is relevant to Board
cases only in the context of the stale complaint rule.”367 In
Manin v. NTSB,368 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia corrected the Board, holding: “As the FAA
now acknowledges, the Board’s statement describing the ‘long
held’ limitation on the applicability of the doctrine of laches was
simply not accurate. Board case law establishes that the laches
defense may be available even when the stale complaint rule is
inapplicable.”369
As evidenced by the Board’s behavior in Ramaprakash, Shrader,
and Manin, the Board does not understand its own rules nor the
import of established legal principles and precedent that gov-
erns the Board’s adjudicatory functions. To be blunt, the Board
flies by the seat of its pants and makes up the rules to achieve
the desired outcome.
Because the Board is not a court, no airman can reasonably
expect due process. The plight of the airmen in Ramaprakash
and Shrader is not unique. Airmen who possess the necessary re-
solve and finances will spend years in litigation before the Board
with repetitive appeals to the United States Courts of Appeal, as
is exhibited by the experience of Dr. Pasternack, who had the
good fortune to be represented by Kathleen Yodice, Esq.370 As
was the case with Ramaprakash and Shrader, it took Dr. Pas-
ternack nearly five years and two appeals to the United States
365 Ramaprakash, 346 F.3d at 1126.
366 N.T.S.B. Order EA-5439, 2008 WL 5972912, at *1 (April 13, 2008).
367 Id. at *3.
368 627 F.3d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
369 Id. at 1242.
370 See Pasternack v. Huerta, 513 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Pasternack v.
NTSB, 596 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Pasternack, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5615,
2012 WL 562137 (Feb. 13, 2012); Pasternack, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-1813, 2008
WL 4143475 (July 31, 2008).
2018] JURISDICTION OVER AIRMEN 319
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to be vindicated
from allegations that he refused the required DOT drug test.371
Because the Board is incapable of administering justice and is
incapable of affording airmen due process of law, Congress
must transfer jurisdiction of airmen certificate in enforcement
cases from the Board to federal district courts.
E. DESPITE THE PASSAGE OF THE PILOT’S BILL OF RIGHTS I,
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE ARE NOT BEING FOLLOWED, AND EFFORTS
TO REMEDIATE THE ADJUDICATIVE FUNCTIONS
OF THE BOARD HAVE FAILED
In the author’s 2010 NTSB White Paper,372 the author made
nine recommendations to improve and reform the adjudicative
functions of the Board, to wit:
(1) That the language declaring that the Board would be
“bound by all validly adopted interpretations of laws and
regulations the Administrator carries out of written
agency policy guidance” be deleted from 49 U.S.C.
§ 44709(d)(3) with the goal of ensuring the adjudicative
functions of the Board would be unhampered and free of
constraints imposed by the FAA;373
(2) That Congress abrogate and abolish Board case law in
which the Board has maintained that it does not have ju-
risdiction over constitutional issues, and that Congress
specifically require the Board to rule on constitutional is-
sues, including due process of law challenges under the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States;374
(3) Not only that deferential language in 49 U.S.C.
§ 44709(d)(3) be eliminated from that statute but, more-
over, that Congress “declare that the Board is not bound
371 See Pasternack, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-1813, 2008 WL 4143475 (July 31,
2008); Pasternack, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5615, 2012 WL 562137 (Feb. 13, 2012);
Pasternack v. NTSB, 596 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Pasternack v. Huerta, 513 F.
App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
372 Alan Armstrong, Call for A Congressional Inquiry into the Arbitrary and Capri-
cious Decisions of the National Transportation Safety Board, 75 J. AIR L. & COM. 3
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 NTSB White Paper].
373 Id. at 61–62.
374 Id. at 62–63.
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by the FAA’s interpretation of its laws and regulations
and/or of any written policy sanction guidance[;]”375
(4) That Congress require the Board to adopt and apply the
Federal Rules of Evidence in aviation enforcement
proceedings;376
(5) That Congress mandate that the Board apply the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in aviation enforcement
proceedings;377
(6) That in those cases where the FAA pursued a case that
was not substantially justified in law or in fact, “the FAA
should be required to pay the actual legal fees and case
expenses incurred by the pilot[;]”378
(7) That Congress “declare that obstruction of justice by the
FAA will not be tolerated and require the Board to report
suspected criminal acts by any Agency employee to the
Department of Justice for investigation and/or
prosecution[;]”379
(8) That Congress conduct an investigation into the manner
in which the Board’s legal staff fashions opinions adopted
by the Board, and “[i]f Congress finds the Board’s legal
staff is not receiving adequate supervision, procedural
and institutional changes should be implemented by the
[Board][;]”380 and
(9) “[T]hat oral argument be provided on appeals [to the
Board] in every case where the FAA revokes an airman’s
certificate on an emergency basis as well as in cases repre-
senting factually complex issues.”381
Congress passed the Pilot’s Bill of Rights (PBR I) on August 3,
2012.382 Section 2(a) of the PBR I provided that actions “relating
to denial, amendment, modification, suspension, or revocation
of an airman certificate, shall be conducted, to the extent practi-
cable, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Federal Rules of Evidence.”383 Accordingly, the author’s
fourth and fifth recommendations in the 2010 NTSB White Pa-
375 Id. at 63–64.
376 Id. at 64–65.
377 Id. at 65.
378 Id. at 65–66.
379 Id. at 66–67.
380 Id. at 67.
381 Id.
382 Pilot’s Bill of Rights No. 112-153, 126 Stat. 1159 (2012).
383 Id. § 2(a) (emphasis added).
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per were implemented by Congress in PBR I. Additionally, Sec-
tion 2(c) of the PBR I deleted the deferential language found in
49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(3) (relating to revocations or suspensions)
and also deleted the deferential language found in 49 C.F.R.
§ 44710(d)(1) (relating to efforts by airman to gain certifica-
tion).384 Accordingly, the first recommendation in the 2010
NTSB White Paper was adopted by Congress in the passage of
the PBR I.
Congress rejected and did not implement the author’s second
recommendation that the Board be required to address consti-
tutional issues, including due process challenges, under the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.385 Conse-
quently, any airman who appeals to the Board will inevitably
find that the Board continues to refuse to address constitutional
issues or constitutional challenges because the Board maintains
that “we do not have jurisdiction to review the constitutionality
of regulations issued by the Administrator or the Secretary of
Transportation.”386 Accordingly, while a federal district court
would readily adjudicate and rule upon constitutional chal-
lenges, the Board refuses to do so.387
The third recommendation in the 2010 NTSB White Paper,
that the Board should not be bound by the FAA’s interpreta-
tions of its laws and regulations, is presently recognized in three
federal statutes relating to the suspension, modification, and
revocation of certificates; appeals from airmen seeking certifica-
tion; and revocation of certificates for controlled substances vio-
lations.388 Congress did not implement the author’s sixth
recommendation that airmen recover their actual attorney’s
fees.389 Congress also did not implement legislation requiring
the Board to report criminal misconduct on the part of the FAA
to the Department of Justice.390 In passing the PBR I, Congress
did not conduct any investigation into the manner in which the
Board’s legal staff fashions opinions for the Board.391 Congress
384 Id. § 2(c).
385 Id. at 1–8.
386 Lybyer, N.T.S.B. Order EA-4822, 2000 WL 193000 (Feb. 10, 2006).
387 Id.
388 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(3) (2012). “When conducting a hearing
under this subsection, the Board is not bound by findings of fact of the Adminis-
trator.” Id. Similar language appears in 49 U.S.C. § 44703(d)(2) (2016) and 49
U.S.C. § 44710(d)(1) (2012).
389 2010 NTSB White Paper, supra note 373, at 65–66.
390 2010 NTSB White Paper, supra note 373, at 67.
391 2010 NTSB White Paper, supra note 373, at 67.
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did not require in passing the PBR I that airmen involved in
emergency revocation cases or in factually complex cases be
guaranteed oral argument before the Board.392
This leaves us with the author’s fourth and fifth recommenda-
tions in the 2010 NTSB White Paper—that is, that Congress re-
quire the Board to adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence to be
employed in aviation enforcement proceedings and that Con-
gress require the Board apply the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in aviation enforcement proceedings.393 While the Board
pays lip service to the fourth and fifth recommendations of the
author’s 2010 NTSB White Paper and to Section 2(a) of PBR I,
as a practical matter, the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure are not being applied in aviation
enforcement proceedings before the Board.
On August 7, 2012, Board Chief Judge Montan˜o executed an
Order “In the Matter of All Pending Cases.”394 The PBR I Order
recites, inter alia, that proceedings governed by 49 U.S.C.
§§ 44703, 44709 “shall be conducted to the extent practicable,
in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence.”395 The Chief Judge, in passing the
PBR I Order, recognized that prior to the enactment of the PBR
I, the Federal Rules were “considered by the Board as instructive
rather than controlling.”396 While the PBR I Order announces
implementation of the Board’s observance of and adherence to
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure “to the extent practicable,”397 execution of that order
has not defeated or curtailed institutional bias at the Board in
favor of the FAA.
In Knight,398 the FAA asserted that the respondent had “re-
fused” a DOT drug test because he failed to provide a sufficient
quantity of urine with “no adequate medical basis” for the fail-
ure.399 In order for the Administrator to carry his burden of
proof under 49 C.F.R. § 821.32 and make out a prima facie case,
it was essential that the FAA prove that the respondent
392 2010 NTSB White Paper, supra note 373, at 67.
393 2010 NTSB White Paper, supra note 373, at 64–65.
394 Order, Alfonso J. Montan˜o, Chief Administrative Law Judge, NTSB, August
7, 2012 [hereinafter PBR I Order].
395 Id. at 1.
396 Id. at 1 n.1.
397 Id. at 1.
398 N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (Sept. 28, 2017) (on file with author).
399 Adm’r Complaint, at ¶ 15, Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (Dec. 19,
2016) (on file with author).
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“[f]ail[ed] to provide a sufficient amount of urine when di-
rected, and it has been determined, through a required medical
evaluation that there was no adequate medical explanation for
the failure (see § 40.193(d)(2))[.]”400 Because it was readily ap-
parent that the Administrator would require expert testimony
from the medical review officer and the referral physician to
show that there was “no adequate medical basis [for the re-
fusal],” respondent propounded interrogatories to the Adminis-
trator, asking the Administrator to disclose expert witnesses in
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(A),
(C).401 Respondent (1) asked that the Administrator disclose ex-
pert witnesses;402 (2) requested that the Administrator provide a
report from any such expert witness;403 and (3) requested that
the Administrator provide a complete copy of the curriculum
vitae for each expert witness.404
In response to respondent’s interrogatory number three, con-
cerning expert witnesses, the Administrator asserted on January
10, 2017 that “[n]o expert witness is expected to be called.”405
With regard to respondent’s request for Production No. 7, seek-
ing a copy of the expert’s report, the Administrator’s response
was that the request was “not applicable.”406 With regard to re-
spondent’s request for Production No. 9, seeking a copy of the
curriculum vitae of each expert witness, the Administrator once
again intoned that the request for production was “not
applicable.”407
On May 15, 2017, at 2:00 p.m., the trial court conducted a
telephone conference with counsel for the Administrator and
respondent and announced that a hearing would be convened
in Atlanta, Georgia, beginning July 18, 2017.408 While the plead-
ing confirming the telephone conference recited the date of the
400 49 C.F.R. § 40.191(a)(5) (2010) (emphasis added).
401 Respondent’s First Discovery Requests to the Adm’r, Knight, N.T.S.B.
Docket No. SE-30308 (Dec. 19, 2016) (on file with author).
402 Id. at Interrogatory No. 3.
403 Id. at Request for Production No. 7.
404 Id. at Request for Production No. 9.
405 Complainant’s Responses to Respondent’s First Discovery Requests to the
Adm’r, at Interrogatory No. 3, Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (Jan. 10,
2017) (on file with author).
406 Id. at Response to Request for Production No. 7.
407 Id. at Response to Request for Production No. 9.
408 Id. at Respondent’s Unopposed Motion for Continuance, May 16, 2017, ¶
1.
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phone call was May 25, the correct date was May 5, 2017,409 but
the matter of consequence is that there was no prehearing order
issued before the FAA filed supplemental discovery responses
on July 3, 2017.410 Notwithstanding the fact that there was no
prehearing order following the May 5, 2017, conference,411 the
trial court made this startling ruling in denying the respondent’s
first motion for summary judgment:
When I originally scheduled the hearing in this proceeding, I issued a
pre-hearing order, in which I directed the parties to exchange infor-
mation, including the identity of any expert witness, no less than
21 days before the commencement of the hearing. Thus, to the
extent the Administrator may need expert testimony to make out
a prima facie case at hearing, he has complied with the timeframe
I ordered in identifying prospective experts. I also note that the
question of whether or not the Administrator has made out a
prima facie case is one properly addressed after he has presented
his case in chief at hearing.412
It is noteworthy that after the respondent filed his first motion
for summary judgment, his second motion for summary judg-
ment, and his affidavit in support of his second motion for sum-
mary judgment (which were subsequently supplemented with
the deposition testimony of respondent’s treating physician, a
board-certified urologist)413 the FAA filed a document with the
Board on July 3, 2017, purporting to supplement discovery
describing the medical review officer, Dr. Barnett, and the refer-
ral physician, Dr. Lee, as “lay opinion witnesses.”414 However,
the FAA’s supplemental disclosure was not in compliance with
409 Id.
410 See Adm’r’s Supplemental Discovery Responses, Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket
No. SE-30308 (July 3, 2017) (on file with author); Notice of Hearing and Prehear-
ing Order, Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (July 21, 2017) (on file with
author).
411 See Notice of Hearing and Prehearing Order entered by Chief ALJ
Montan˜o, Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (July 21, 2017) (on file with
author).
412 Order Denying Parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, at 3, Knight,
N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (Sept. 5, 2017) (emphasis added) (on file with
author).
413 Respondent’s First Motion for Summary Judgment, Knight, N.T.S.B.
Docket No. SE-30308 (June 7, 2017) (on file with author); Respondent’s Second
Motion for Summary Judgment, Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (June 23,
2017) (on file with author), together with Respondent’s Affidavit, Knight,
N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (on file with author).
414 Adm’r’s Supplemental Discovery Responses, Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No.
SE-30308 (July 3, 2017) (on file with author).
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any prehearing order, since no such order was entered until
eighteen days after the supplemental disclosure, i.e., on July 21,
2017.415
There never was any designation filed on the record disclos-
ing either Dr. Barnett or Dr. Lee as an expert witness as re-
quired by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(A),
(C).416 Respondent Knight, in addition to bringing his first mo-
tion for summary judgment, also filed a motion to exclude any
testimony from the medical review officer and the referral physi-
cian, and further moved to strike their testimony based upon
the failure of the FAA to disclose these experts as required by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(C).417
In Musser v. Gentiva Health Services,418 the plaintiffs waited until
after the defendant had moved for summary judgment to dis-
close their witnesses, and the district court, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1), excluded the expert testimony
and granted summary judgment to the defendant. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
sanction and grant of summary judgment holding, stating that
“[f]ormal disclosure of experts is not pointless. Knowing the
identity of the opponent’s expert witness allows a party to prop-
erly prepare for trial. Gentiva should not be made to assume
that each witness disclosed by the Mussers could be an expert wit-
ness at trial.”419 The conduct forbidden in Musser is exactly what
415 Notice of Hearing and Prehearing Order entered by Chief ALJ Montan˜o,
Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (July 21, 2017) (on file with author).
416 Gyrodata, Inc. v. Atlantic Inertial Sys., Inc., No. CV 08-7897-GHK, 2011 WL
13116732, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011)
Plaintiff did not sufficiently put Defendants on notice that so-called
‘lay expert’ witnesses would provide Rule 702 testimony . . . Rule
26(a)(2)(A) requires parties to answer a simple question: Will any
witness provide expert testimony? Plaintiff’s oxymoronic designa-
tion of these witnesses as ‘lay experts’ does not clearly answer this
question, and thus does not satisfy the requirement of Rule
26(a)(2)(A).
Id.
417 See Respondent’s Motion to Exclude Any Testimony from Randy Barnet,
D.O., Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (June 6, 2017) (on file with author);
Respondent’s Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1), FRCP to Exclude
Any Testimony from Nicola Lee, M.D., Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308
(June 15, 2017) (on file with author); and Respondent’s Motion, Pursuant to
Rule 37(c)(1), to Strike and Exclude Any FAA Expert Testimony for Failure to
Designate Rule 702 Experts as Required by Rule 26(a)(2)(C), Knight, N.T.S.B.
Docket No. SE-30308 (July 21, 2017) (on file with author).
418 356 F.3d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 2004).
419 Id. (emphasis added).
326 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [83
the FAA did in Knight, and the Board Chief ALJ specifically en-
dorsed this improper and unlawful practice.420
In Knight, after respondent filed his first and second motions
for summary judgment, the FAA, on July 3, 2017, portrayed Doc-
tors Barnett and Lee (the medical review officer and referral
physician) as fact witnesses who would provide “lay opinion testi-
mony.”421 Not only were the FAA’s discovery responses evasive
by portraying the medical review officer and referral physician
as only providing “lay opinion testimony” but also the Adminis-
trator’s responses were further evasive since the Administrator
said that the doctors would testify “to the extent necessary.”422
The Administrator’s responses in Knight were clearly inadequate
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4) and did not
constitute an expert witness designation as required by Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(A), (C).423 As evidenced by
this article, the Chief ALJ, out of concern for the “paruresis for a
day defense”424 ignored Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
26(a)(2)(A) and (C), 37(a)(4), and 26(g)(1)425 and pro-
nounced the FAA had made a timely disclosure of expert wit-
nesses based upon a prehearing order that did not exist at the
time the FAA’s supplemental disclosures were served.426
The Board has previously affirmed orders granting summary
judgment on behalf the Administrator, and, in doing so, has
specifically recognized the binding precedent of the United
States Supreme Court in the form of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.427 In
420 See Order Denying Parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, at 3,
Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (Sept. 5, 2017) (on file with author).
421 See Adm’r’s Supplemental Discovery Responses, at ¶¶ 1, 2, Knight, N.T.S.B.
Docket No. SE-30308 (July 3, 2017) (on file with author); see also Notice of Hear-
ing and Prehearing Order, Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (July 21, 2017)
(on file with author).
422 Id.
423 Musser, 356 F.3d at 757 (“Gentiva should not be made to assume that each
witness disclosed by the Mussers could be an expert witness at trial.”).
424 Knight Transcript, supra note 17, at 621–25.
425 Musser, 356 F.3d at 757; Gyrodata, Inc. v. Atlantic Inertial Sys., Inc., No. CV
08-7897-GHK, 2011 WL 13116732, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011).
426 Adm’r’s Supplemental Discovery Responses, Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No.
SE-30308 (July 3, 2017) (on file with author); Notice of Hearing and Prehearing
Order, Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (July 21, 2017) (on file with
author).
427 See Martinez, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5409, 2008 WL 4603570, at *3 (Oct. 7,
2008) (“In this regard, we recognize that Federal courts have granted summary
judgment when no genuine issues of material fact exist.”) (citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–24 (1986)); Manin, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5439, 2008
WL 4972912, at *3 (Apr. 13, 2008) (“In this regard, we recognize that Federal
2018] JURISDICTION OVER AIRMEN 327
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,428 the plaintiff brought an action for the
death of her deceased husband but was unable to produce any
evidence in support of her allegations that the decedent had
been exposed to any asbestos products of Celotex.429 Just like
the FAA in Knight, in response to interrogatories, the plaintiff
could not provide “any witnesses who could testify about the de-
cedent’s exposure to petitioner’s asbestos products.”430 The dis-
trict court’s grant of summary judgment to Celotex was reversed
by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia which reasoned, incorrectly, it was the burden of Celotex “to
negate such exposure.”431 Not only did the majority of a divided
panel of the D.C. Circuit believe it was the obligation of the mo-
vant to negate the elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case
but the majority also “declined to consider petitioner’s argu-
ment that none of the evidence produced by respondent in op-
position to the motion for summary judgment would have been
admissible at trial.”432 According to the dissenting judge, “[t]he
majority’s decision ‘undermines the traditional authority of trial
judges to grant summary judgment in meritless cases.’”433
The United States Supreme Court, in reversing the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Celotex,
declared:
Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the plead-
ings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no gen-
uine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” In our view, the plain language
of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation,
there can be “no genuine issue as to any material fact,” since the
complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts imma-
courts have granted summary judgment when no genuine issues of material facts
exist.”); Singleton, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5437, 2009 WL 870356, at *11 n.6
(Mar. 24, 2009).
428 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 319.
429 Id.
430 Id. at 320.
431 Id. at 319.
432 Id. at 322.
433 Id.
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terial. The moving party is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law” because the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient
showing of an essential element of her case with respect to which
she has the burden of proof. “[T]h[e] standard [for granting
summary judgment] mirrors the standard for directed verdict
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a)[.]”434
Not only did the Supreme Court declare that the moving
party is entitled to judgment if he can demonstrate that the op-
posing party cannot make out a prima facie case but the Court
also declared, “we find no express or implied requirement in
Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits
or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.”435
Since the Administrator, by his own admissions, had no expert
witnesses, the respondent was entitled to summary judgment in
Knight.436 However, because of the institutional bias the FAA en-
joys before the Board, and despite the fact there are numerous
cases where the FAA has prevailed in a motion for summary
judgment,437 the Board’s Chief Law Judge denied both the re-
spondent’s first motion for summary judgment and second mo-
tion for summary judgment despite the fact that they were
supported by the unopposed testimony of respondent’s treating
physician and urologist.438 The FAA had failed to demonstrate
that there is a material question of fact as required by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), since the testimony of respon-
dent’s urologist was uncontradicted that he suffered from a
medical condition, i.e., “an ascertainable physiological condi-
tion” that prevented him from providing 45mL of urine.439
434 Id. at 322–23 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
(1986)).
435 Id. at 323.
436 Id. at 322–23.
437 See Singleton, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5437, 2009 WL 870356, at *11 n.6
(Mar. 24, 2009); Martinez, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5409, 2008 WL 4603570, at *3
(Oct. 7, 2008); Manin, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5439, 2008 WL 4972912, at *3
(Apr. 13, 2008).
438 See Order Denying Parties’ Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, Knight,
N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (Sept. 5, 2017) (on file with author).
439 See De. Tr. Bryan E. Hill, M.D., 28/23-25, 29/1-25, 21/24-25, 22/1-21, 18/1-
25, 19/1-25, 20/1-25, Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (on file with au-
thor); Respondent’s Exhibit 28, Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (on file
with author); 49 C.F.R. § 40.193(e) (2018). Dr. Hill testified based upon his
knowledge, training, skill, experience, and education to a reasonable degree of
medical and scientific probability that on August 26, 2016, respondent Knight
was unable to provide a 45mL specimen of urine because he had an “ascertaina-
ble physiological condition, e.g., a urinary system dysfunction” within the purview
of 49 C.F.R. § 40.193(e). Id.
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The author submits that the foregoing rulings of the Chief
ALJ in Knight demonstrate that it is impossible to obtain a fair
hearing before the Board or its law judges. The FAA does not
have to disclose expert witnesses since disclosure of physicians as
“lay opinion witnesses” and as “potential experts” is sufficient for
purposes of the Chief ALJ even though such a ruling is directly
contradicted by a substantial body of federal court precedent, as
well as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal
Rules of Evidence.440 Despite the foregoing body of law and de-
spite the fact that, by virtue of the PBR I, the Board is required
to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the Chief ALJ denied motions to exclude the
testimony of the medical review officer and referral physician
declaring, “[r]espondent’s motions to exclude the testimony of
Drs. Lee and Barnett are unsupported by Board case law and are
not persuasive.”441 The Board’s Chief ALJ, in making the forego-
ing ruling, refused to even acknowledge that the standards he
was supposed to follow under Section 2(a) of the PBR I were the
Federal Rules of Evidence and FRCP rather than “Board case
law.”442 It is also noteworthy that the Chief ALJ created a conflict
as a pretext for denying summary judgment where no conflict
existed, since the FAA failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c)(4) and did not file any affidavits or sworn testi-
mony in opposition to Knight’s first and second motions for
summary judgment.443
Any seasoned trial lawyer will find litigating before the Board
extremely frustrating. In effect, there are no rules. Under the
mantle of concerns for air safety and public interest, the Board
is complicit with the FAA to ensure that even in cases where no
material question of fact exists, the case goes to trial so the ALJ
can make “credibility” assessments in favor of the FAA justified
440 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(A), 26(a)(2)(C), 26(g), 37(a)(4),
37(c)(1); FED. R. EVID. 701, 702, 704, 705; Musser v. Gentiva Health Servs, 356
F.3d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 2004); Gyrodata, Inc. v. Atlantic Inertial Sys., Inc., No. CV
08-7897-GHK, 2011 WL 13116732, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2011).
441 See Order Denying Respondent’s Motions to Exclude Any Testimony of
Randy Barnett, D.O. and Nicola Lee, M.D., at 2, Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-
30308 (Sept. 8, 2017) (on file with author).
442 Id.
443 See Order Denying Parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, at 4,
Knight, N.T.S.B. Docket No. SE-30308 (Sept. 5, 2017 ) (“However, the credibility
of the history respondent gave Dr. Hill must be assessed by the trier of fact.”) (on
file with author).
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only as being based upon “safety in air commerce or air trans-
portation and the public interest[.]”444
III. CONCLUSION
When Congress passed the PBR I providing that the Federal
Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would
be enforced in aviation enforcement proceedings before the
Board, there was hope that this would signal a reform of the
manner in which litigation is conducted before the Board. How-
ever, the institutional bias that the Board confers upon the FAA
to the detriment of the pilot has not been eradicated by the pas-
sage of the PBR I. “The definition of insanity is doing the same
thing over and over again, but expecting different results.”445 To
allow the Board to continue to adjudicate airman enforcement
and certification cases while expecting different results is insane.
While Senate Bill 755, the Fairness for Pilots Act, would, if en-
acted into law, permit de novo review of Board decisions in fed-
eral district court,446 it does not confer original jurisdiction of
airmen certification and enforcement actions in federal district
court. Consequently, the proposed legislation will not solve the
problem. Decades of case law demonstrates that the Board, as
an adjudicatory mechanism, does not work. The Board consist-
ently exhibits bias in favor of the Administrator. The Board con-
sistently adjudicates cases in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
The Board consistently refuses to sanction misconduct on the
part of the FAA Administrator, and while there is limited author-
ity for the proposition that the Board may in extreme cases actu-
ally consider due process,447 the Board maintains it does not
have jurisdiction to reach constitutional questions.448
444 49 U.S.C. § 44709(d)(1)(A) (2012).
445 This quote has been attributed to the noted physicist, Albert Einstein.
446 Fairness for Pilots Act, S. 755, 115th Cong. § 2(b)(1)(A) (2017) (“[T]he
district court shall review the denial, suspension, or revocation de novo[.]”).
447 Mashadov, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-5627, 2012 WL 1795820, at *2 (May 1,
2012) (“[T]he fact that the Administrator would bring an international falsifica-
tion case to revoke all of respondent’s certificates, yet not move to admit the very
document the Administrator accuses respondent of falsifying, strains credulity.
Due process demands we not overlook this error[.]”); Randall, 3 N.T.S.B. 3624,
3626 (1981) (“The fact that the Administrator may be authorized to use FDR
tapes in an enforcement proceeding does not, as the law judge appears to have
assumed, entitle him to disregard a policy he has adopted[.]”).
448 Lybyer, N.T.S.B. Order No. EA-4822, 2000 WL 193000, at *1 (Feb. 10,
2000).
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An airman has a constitutional right to due process before his
license is revoked or suspended.449 An airman has a statutory
right that any proceeding brought by the FAA to revoke or sus-
pend his license will be adjudicated “in an impartial manner.”450
These constitutional guarantees of due process of law for pilots
are not being met by the existing adjudicatory mechanisms pro-
vided by the Board. The time has come to transfer jurisdiction
of airman certification and enforcement cases from the Board
to the federal district courts.
449 U.S. CONST. amend. V; 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557, 558 (2018); White v.
Franklin, 637 F. Supp. 601, 610–11 (N.D. Miss. 1986).
450 5 U.S.C. § 556(b).
